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LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND RELIGIOUS
MORALITY*
Michael J. Perry**
It would truly be a sad thing if the religious and moral convictions
upon which the American experiment was founded could now
somehow be considered a danger to free society, such that those
who would bring these convictions to bear upon your nation's pub-
lic life would be denied a voice in debating and resolving issues of
public policy. The original separation of church and state in the
United States was certainly not an effort to ban all religious convic-
tion from the public sphere, a kind of banishment of God from civil
society. Indeed, the vast majority of Americans, regardless of their
religious persuasion, are convinced that religious conviction and re-
ligiously informed moral argument have a vital role in public life.
-Pope John Paul Ill
* This essay, which was the basis of the 1998 Annual Lecture of the DePaul University
Center for Church/State Studies (April 16, 1998), draws on, clarifies, and develops some
arguments originally presented in my book, Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral
Perspectives (Oxford Univ. Press, 1997). For a fuller treatment of some of the issues presented in
this essay, the reader should consult Religion in Politics. I am grateful to the Oxford University
Press for permission to include material from Religion in Politics in this essay. I am also grateful
to the DePaul University Center for Church/State Studies for the invitation to deliver the lecture
and for its gracious hospitality; in particular, I am grateful to Craig Mousin, Executive Director
of the Center.
An earlier version of this essay was the basis for the inaugural Robert Litowitz Lecture in
Ethics and Public Policy, which I delivered at Yale University on April 14, 1997. For the
invitation to deliver the Litowitz Lecture, which is sponsored by the Yale University Program in
Ethics, Politics, and Economics, I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman of the Law School, Margaret
Farley of the Divinity School, and Ian Shapiro of the Department of Political Science.
For helpful comments on one or another draft of this essay, I am grateful to several friends
and colleagues: Robert Audi, Tom Berg, John Coleman, S.J., John Deigh, Chris Eberle, Marie
Failinger, Margaret Farley, Mayer Freed, David Friedman, Fred Gedicks, Jim Heft, Tim Jackson,
Richard Kraut, Gary Leedes, Errol Rohr, Stephen Siegel, Doug Smith, Larry Solum, Dave Van
Zandt, Paul Weithman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. I am especially indebted to Steve Smith and
Laura Underkuffler-Freund. Thanks in part to the comments that these friends and colleagues
have provided, I am acutely aware that this essay is far from finished; it is a work-in-progress.
This essay is dedicated to the memory of a beloved, exceptional young man, son of Fred and
Nicea Gedicks, who died in the first semester of his freshman year at Wake Forest University:
Alexander Philip Gedicks, 1978-1997.
** University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest University.
1. John Paul l on the American Experiment, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1998, at 36-37 (quoting Pope
John Paul's speech that was delivered on December 17, 1997).
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The political community we call the United States of America is,
whatever else it may be, a democracy.2 The United States is, more-
over, a liberal democracy: a democracy committed-in the case of the
United States, constitutionally committed-to certain basic human
freedoms, understood both as constitutive of "genuine democracy ' 3
and as limits on the laws a political majority may enact, the policies it
may pursue, and the actions it may take. 4 I have discussed one such
freedom elsewhere: freedom of religion, which in the United States is,
famously, a constitutional freedom. 5
The general question I want to address here is this: In a liberal de-
mocracy, like the United States, what role is it proper for religion to
play in politics? More precisely, what role is it proper for religious
arguments about the morality of human conduct to play in politics?
2. More precisely, the United States is, in the main, a representative rather than a direct
democracy.
3. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 572 (Henry J.
Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996) (commenting on the European Convention on Human
Rights):
[T]he third major impetus towards a Convention [was] the desire to bring the non-
Communist countries of Europe together within a common ideological framework and
to consolidate their unity in the face of the Communist threat. "Genuine democracy"
(to which the Statute of the Council of Europe commits its members) or the "effective
political democracy" to which the Preamble of the Convention refers, had to be clearly
distinguished from the "people's democracy" which was practiced and promoted by the
Soviet Union and its allies.
4. See Amy Gutmann, Democracy, Philosophy, and Justification, in DEMOCRACY AND DIF-
FERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 340 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996):
Polyarchies, or what we might call nonideal democracies, are characterized, at mini-
mum, by guarantees of free political speech, press, association, and equal suffrage for
all adults, the right of all adults above a certain age to run for political office, the rule of
law, and frequent, competitive elections that are procedurally fair.
5. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPEC-
TIvES 9-42 (1997).
There has been a flurry of writing recently about the philosophical foundations of democracy.
See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 4, at 333-59 (including essays by Richard
Rorty, Robert A. Dahl, Amy Gutmann, and Benjamin R. Barber all addressing the question
Does Democracy Need Foundations?). I agree both that "[t]he great democratic movements of
the nineteenth century were less concerned to implement an abstract democratic ideal than, as
John Dewey observed, 'to remedy evils experienced in consequence of prior political institu-
tions,"' Ian Shapiro, Elements of Democratic Justice, 24 POL. THEORY 579 (1996) (quoting JOHN
DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 84-85 (1927)), and that, "as the Pope affirms ...
democracy is uniquely valuable because it embodies more fully than any alternative system the
principle of the fundamental moral equality of citizens." Robert P. George, The Tyrant State,
FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 39, 39. Dewey's observation anticipated Winston Churchill's state-
ment in the British House of Commons on Nov. 11, 1947:
Many forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and
woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said
that democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time.
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More precisely still: first, is it proper for religious believers to present
such arguments in public political debate; and second, is it proper for
religious believers to rely on such arguments as a basis of political
choice?
Two phrases appear throughout my discussion: "religious argu-
ments" and "political choices." The political choices with which I am
concerned in this essay are those that ban or otherwise disfavor one or
another sort of human conduct based on the view that the conduct is
immoral. 6 A law banning abortion is a prime example of the kind of
political choice I have in mind; a legislature's refusal to grant legal
status to same-sex unions is another. The religious arguments with
which I am concerned here are arguments that one or another sort of
human conduct, like abortion or homosexual sexual conduct, is im-
moral. By a "religious" argument, I mean an argument that relies on,
inter alia, a religious belief: an argument that presupposes the truth of
a religious belief and includes that belief as one of its essential prem-
ises. A "religious" belief is, for present purposes, either the belief that
God exists-"God" in the sense of a transcendent reality that is the
source, the ground, and the end of everything-or a belief about the
nature, the activity, or the will of God. 7 This definition of a "reli-
gious" argument covers, for example, the claim that the Bible is God's
revealed word, and the claim that when speaking ex cathedra on mat-
6. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710
(1995):
[M]uch legal enforcement of morality is uncontroversial and rarely discussed. Disa-
greement arises only when the law enforces aspects of morality that do not involve
protecting others from fairly direct harms. More precisely, people raise questions
about legal requirements (1) to perform acts that benefit others, (2) to refrain from acts
that cause indirect harms to others, (3) to refrain from acts that cause harm to them-
selves, (4) to refrain from acts that offend others, and (5) to refrain from acts that
others believe are immoral.
7. A belief can be "nonreligious" in one of two senses. The belief that God does not exist is
nonreligious in the sense of "atheistic." A belief that is about something other than God's exist-
ence, nonexistence, nature, activity, or will is nonreligious in the sense of "secular." In addition
to religious arguments, we can imagine both "atheistic" arguments and "secular" arguments.
One who is "agnostic" about the existence of God-who neither believes nor disbelieves that
God exists-will find only some secular arguments persuasive. Cf. KENT GREENAWALT, PRI-
VATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 63 (1995) ("assum[ing] that a principle of restraint
against reliance on religious grounds would also bar reliance on antireligious grounds") (endnote
omitted).
Although some Buddhist sects are theistic, Buddhism-unlike Christianity, for example-is
predominantly nontheistic, in the sense that Buddhism does not affirm the meaningfulness of
"God"-talk. Nonetheless, Buddhism does seem to affirm the existence of a transcendent reality
that is the source, the ground, and the end of everything else. See THE EMPTYING GOD: A
BUDDHIST-JEWISH-CHRISTIAN CONVERSATION (John B. Cobb, Jr. & Christopher Ives eds.,
1990); David Tracy, Kenosis, Sunyata, and Trinity: A Dialogue With Masao Abe, in THE EMPTY-
ING GOD, supra, at 135.
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ters of faith or morals the Pope speaks infallibly. Both claims are
based on a belief about the activity of God.
I. RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS IN PUBLIC POLITICAL DEBATE
Let us turn first to this question: Is it proper for religious believers
to present, in public political debate-in public debate about what
political choices to make-religiously-based arguments about the mo-
rality of human conduct? I want to begin by disaggregating the ques-
tion into two distinct but related inquiries; the first of which concerns
the politics of the United States, the second, the politics of any liberal
democracy, including the United States. First, as a matter of Ameri-
can constitutional law, may religious believers present religiously-
based moral arguments in public political debate? Second, not as a
matter of constitutional law but only of what we may call, for want of
a better term, political morality, should religious believers present
such arguments in public political debate; that is, is it proper, as a
matter of (nonconstitutional) political morality, for them to do so?
I have addressed the former question elsewhere. The question is
not difficult, and the answer I have given is not controversial: Neither
citizens nor legislators or other governmental policymakers would vio-
late the constitutional requirement that government not "establish"
religion were they to present religiously-based moral arguments in
public political debate. Hereafter, when I say policymakers, I mean
governmental policymakers, like the President of the United States or
the governor of a state.8 Indeed, although government would almost
certainly violate the constitutional requirement that it not "abridge
the freedom of speech" were it to ban or otherwise restrain political
speech because of the content of the speech, the government would
violate, in addition, the constitutional requirement that it not "pro-
hibit the free exercise of religion" were it to ban or otherwise restrain
political speech because the content of the speech was religious. 9
However, that citizens and even legislators or other policymakers
may, as a matter of constitutional law, present religious arguments
about the morality of human conduct in public political debate-that
they are constitutionally free to present such arguments in public
political debate-does not mean that as a matter of political morality
8. 1 often refer, in this essay, to legislators and other governmental policymakers. What about
judges? Are they a special case? See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 102-04.
9. See id. at 32-33; Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political,
29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793, 795-807 (1996).
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they should do so. Is it proper for them to do so? 1° I have addressed
that question at length elsewhere;" here I will be brief.
Imagine that it is proposed to make, or to maintain, a political
choice banning or otherwise disfavoring a particular sort of human
conduct-for example, the political choice not to grant legal recogni-
tion to same-sex unions. Imagine, too, that a widely accepted reli-
gious argument supports the claim that the conduct is immoral; for
example, the argument that God reveals in the Bible that each and
every instance of homosexual sexual conduct is immoral. It is inevita-
ble, in the United States, that some citizens and legislators and other
policymakers will support the political choice at least partly on the
basis of the religious argument. It is also inevitable that some citizens
and legislators, because they accept the religious argument, will take
more seriously than they otherwise would, and perhaps accept, a secu-
lar argument that supports the political choice; for example, the argu-
ment that homosexuality, like alcoholism, is a pathology that ought
not be indulged, 12 or the argument that granting legal recognition to
same-sex unions would threaten the institution of heterosexual mar-
riage and other "traditional family values." Because of the role that
religiously-based moral arguments inevitably play in the political pro-
cess, it is important that such arguments, no less than secular moral
arguments, be presented in public political debate, so that they can be
tested there.13
10. It bears emphasis that the question I am about to address, about the role of religious
arguments in public political debate, is about political morality, not political strategy.
[T]he distinction between principle and prudence should be emphasized. The funda-
mental question is not whether, as a matter of prudent judgment in a religiously plural-
ist society, those who hold particular religious views ought to cast their arguments in
secular terms. Even an outsider can say that the answer to that question is clearly,
"Yes, most of the time," for only such a course is likely to be successful overall.
Mark Tushnet, The Limits of the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic, in THE ROLE OF
RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 191, 213 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds.,
1991).
11. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 43-61.
12. Jeffrey Siker, a Christian ethicist and ordained minister of the Presbyterian Church
(USA), has persuasively criticized the effort to analogize homosexuality to alcoholism. See Jef-
frey S. Siker, Homosexual Christians, the Bible, and Gentile Inclusion: Confessions of a Re-
penting Heterosexist, in HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE CHURCH: BOTH SIDES OF THE DEBATE 178,
181-83 (Jeffrey S. Siker ed., 1994).
13. Moreover, it is sometimes fitting that such an argument be tested, in the to and fro of
public political debate, by a competing religious argument of the same genre-for example, a
scripture-based argument. Scripture scholar Luke Timothy Johnson's admonition is relevant
here:
If liberal Christians committed to sexual equality and religious tolerance abandon
these texts as useless, they also abandon the field of Christian hermeneutics to those
whose fearful and-it must be said-sometimes hate-filled apprehension of Christian-
ity will lead them to exploit and emphasize just those elements of the tradition that
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All of this is obvious; at least, all of this seems obvious to me. None-
theless, some persons want to keep religiously-based moral arguments
out of public political debate as much as possible. For example,
American philosopher Richard Rorty has written approvingly of
"privatizing religion-keeping it out of.. . 'the public square,' making
it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy. '14
One reason for wanting to "privatize" religion is that religious de-
bates about controversial political issues can be quite divisive.15 But
American history does not suggest that religious debates about con-
troversial issues-racial discrimination, for example or war-are inva-
riably more divisive than secular debates about those or other issues.16
Some issues are so controversial that debate about them is inevitably
divisive without regard to whether the debate is partly religious or,
instead, only secular.
have proven harmful to humans. If what Phyllis Trible has perceptively termed "texts
of terror" within the Bible are not encountered publicly and engaged intellectually by a
hermeneutics that is at once faithful and critical, then they will continue to exercise
their potential for harm among those who, without challenge, can claim scriptural au-
thority for their own dark impulses.
Luke Timothy Johnson, Religious Rights and Christian Texts, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 65, 72-73 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan David van
der Vyver eds., 1996) (footnote omitted).
It is easy to anticipate the reply that public political debate is simply too debased to serve as a
context for serious critical discussion of religiously-based moral arguments. My response is two-
fold. First, if public political debate is too debased to serve as a context for serious critical
discussion of religiously-based moral arguments, then it is too debased to serve as a context for
serious critical discussion of secular moral arguments as well, and of much else too. Second, the
issue that engages me in this essay is the proper role of religion, not in a politics too debased for
serious critical discussion of moral arguments, but in a politics fit for such discussion.
14. Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (1994).
15. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640-41 (1978) (Brennan, J. concurring):
That public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may arouse emotion, may incite,
may foment religious divisiveness and strife does not rob it of constitutional protection
.... The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is to reduce or eliminate
religious divisiveness or strife, does not place religious discussion, association, or polit-
ical participation in a status less preferred than rights of discussion, association and
political participation generally ....
The State's goal of preventing sectarian bickering and strife may not be accomplished
by regulating religious speech and political association ....
In short, government may not as a goal promote "safe thinking" with respect to reli-
gion and fence out from political participation those, such as ministers, whom it regards
as over involved in religion .... The Establishment Clause, properly understood, ...
may not be used as a sword to justify repression of religion or its adherents from any
aspect of public life.
(footnotes and citations omitted).
16. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 BYU L. REV.
405, 413 (1986): "Religious differences in this country have never generated the civil discord
experienced in political conflicts over such issues as the Vietnam War, racial segregation, the
Red Scare, unionization, or slavery."
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To be sure, religious discourse in public-whether in public political
debate or in other parts of our public culture-is sometimes quite sec-
tarian and therefore divisive. But religiously-based moral discourse is
not necessarily more sectarian than secular moral discourse. It can be
much less sectarian. After all, certain basic moral premises common
to the Jewish and Christian traditions, in conjunction with the support-
ing religious premises, still constitute the fundamental moral horizon
of most Americans, much more so than do Kantian (or neo-Kantian),
Millian, or Nietzschean premises, and so forth. 17
Another reason for wanting to keep religiously-based moral argu-
ments out of public political debate focuses on the inability of some
persons to gain a critical distance on their religious beliefs, the kind of
critical distance essential to truly deliberative debate. But in the
United States and in other liberal democracies, many persons are able
to gain a critical distance on their religious beliefs;18 they are certainly
as able to do so as they are able to gain a critical distance on other
17. According to John Coleman, "the tradition of biblical religion is arguably the most power-
ful and pervasive symbolic resource" for public ethics in the United States today. JOHN COLE-
MAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY 192 (1982). "[O]ur tradition of religious ethics
seems .. .to enjoy a more obvious public vigor and availability as a resource for renewal in
American culture than either the tradition of classic republican theory or the American tradition
of public philosophy." Id. (footnote omitted). Coleman reminds us that "the strongest American
voices for a compassionate just community always appealed in public to religious imagery and
sentiments, from Winthrop and Sam Adams, Melville and the Lincoln of the second inaugural
address, to Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr and Frederick Douglass and Martin
Luther King." Id. at 193. As Coleman explains, "The American religious ethic and rhetoric
contain rich, polyvalent symbolic power to command commitments of emotional depth, when
compared to 'secular' language,... [which] remains exceedingly 'thin' as a symbol system." Id.
Coleman emphasizes that "when used as a public discourse, the language of biblical religion is
beyond the control of any particular denominational theology. It represents a common Ameri-
can cultural patrimony .... American public theology or religious ethics ... cannot be purely
sectarian. The biblical language belongs to no one church, denomination, or sect." Id. at 194
(footnote omitted). In Coleman's view,
The genius of the public American theology ... is that it has transcended denomina-
tions, been espoused by people as diverse as Abraham Lincoln and Robert Bellah who
neither were professional theologians nor belonged to any specific church and, even in
the work of specifically trained professional theologians, such as Reinhold Neibuhr, has
appealed less to revelational warrant for its authority within public policy discussions
than to the ability of biblical insights and symbols to convey a deeper human wis-
dom .... Biblical imagery ... lies at the heart of the American self-understanding. It is
neither parochial nor extrinsic.
Id. at 194-95.
Coleman adds: "I am further strongly convinced that the Enlightenment desire for an un-
mediated universal fraternity and language (resting as it did on unreflected allegiance to very
particular communities and language, conditioned by time and culture) was destructive of the
lesser, real 'fraternities'-in [Wilson Carey] McWilliams' sense-in American life." Id. at 194.
18. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Com-
peting Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1993-94).
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fundamental beliefs. 19 Undeniably, some religious believers are un-
able to gain much, if any critical distance on their fundamental reli-
gious beliefs. As so much in the twentieth century attests, however,
one need not be a religious believer to adhere to one's fundamental
beliefs with closed-minded or even fanatical tenacity.
Although no one who has lived through recent American history
should believe that religious contributions to the public discussion of
controversial moral issues are invariably deliberative rather than dog-
matic, there is no reason to believe that religious contributions are
never deliberative. Religious discourse about the difficult moral is-
sues that engage and divide us citizens of liberal democratic societies
is not necessarily more monologic (or otherwise problematic) than
resolutely secular discourse about those issues. Because of the reli-
gious illiteracy-and, alas, even prejudice-rampant among many
nonreligious intellectuals,20 we probably need reminding that, at its
best, religious discourse in public culture is not less dialogic-not less
19. In my opinion, David Tracy speaks for many religious believers when he writes:
For believers to be unable to learn from secular feminists on the patriarchal nature of
most religions or to be unwilling to be challenged by Feuerbach, Darwin, Marx, Freud,
or Nietzsche is to refuse to take seriously the religion's own suspicions on the existence
of those fundamental distortions named sin, ignorance, or illusion. The interpretations
of believers will, of course, be grounded in some fundamental trust in, and loyalty to,
the Ultimate Reality both disclosed and concealed in one's own religious tradition. But
fundamental trust, as any experience of friendship can teach, is not immune to either
criticism or suspicion. A religious person will ordinarily fashion some hermeneutics of
trust, even one of friendship and love, for the religious classics of her or his tradition.
But, as any genuine understanding of friendship shows, friendship often demands both
critique and suspicion. A belief in a pure and innocent love is one of the less happy
inventions of the romantics. A friendship that never includes critique and even, when
appropriate, suspicion is a friendship barely removed from the polite and wary commu-
nication of strangers. As Buber showed, in every I-thou encounter, however transient,
we encounter some new dimension of reality. But if that encounter is to prove more
than transitory, the difficult ways of friendship need a trust powerful enough to risk
itself in critique and suspicion. To claim that this may be true of all our other loves but
not true of our love for, and trust in, our religious tradition makes very little sense
either hermeneutically or religiously.
DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 112 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
To his credit, Richard Rorty insists that there is "hypocrisy ... in saying that believers some-
how have no right to base their political views on their religious faith, whereas we atheists have
every right to base ours on Enlightenment philosophy. The claim that in doing so we are appeal-
ing to reason, whereas the religious are being irrational, is hokum." Rorty, supra note 14, at 4.
20. As David Tracy has written, religion is
the single subject about which many intellectuals can feel free to be ignorant. Often
abetted by the churches, they need not study religion, for "everybody" already knows
what religion is: It is a private consumer product that some people seem to need. Its
former social role was poisonous. Its present privatization is harmless enough to wish it
well from a civilized distance. Religion seems to be the sort of thing one likes "if that's
the sort of thing one likes."
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open-minded, not less deliberative-than is, at its best, secular dis-
course in public culture. Nor, at its worst, is religious discourse more
monologic-more closed-minded and dogmatic-than is, at its worst,
secular discourse.21 David Hollenbach's work has developed this im-
portant point:
Much discussion of the public role of religion in recent political
thought presupposes that religion is more likely to fan the flames of
discord than to contribute to social concord. This is certainly true of
some forms of religious belief, but hardly of all. Many religious
communities recognize that their traditions are dynamic and that
their understandings of God are not identical with the reality of
God. Such communities have in the past and can in the future en-
gage in the religious equivalent of intellectual solidarity, often
called ecumenical or interreligious dialogue.22
DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION 13 (1981). See also KENT GREENAWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6 (1988): "A good many professors and other intel-
lectuals display a hostility or skeptical indifference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised
contempt for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific inquiry and ordinary
human experience." Cf. Special Issue-Religion and the Media: Three Forums, COMMONWEAL,
Feb. 24, 1995, at 3 (discussing the relation between religion and the media; and noting that news
treatment of religion is often "incomplete or inadequate, and sometimes incompetent or
biased.").
21. See GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE, supra note 20, at
159: "[I]f the worry is open-mindedness and sensitivity to publicly accessible reasons, drawing a
sharp distinction between religious convictions and [secular] personal bases [of judgment] would
be an extremely crude tool."
David Tracy has lamented that:
For however often the word is bandied about, dialogue remains a rare phenomenon in
anyone's experience. Dialogue demands the intellectual, moral, and, at the limit, reli-
gious ability to struggle to hear another and to respond. To respond critically, and even
suspiciously when necessary, but to respond only in dialogical relationship to a real, not
a projected other.
DAVID TRACY, DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER 4 (1990). Steven Smith, commenting wryly that
"'dialogue' seems to have become the all-purpose elixir of our time," has suggested that "[t]he
hard question is not whether people should talk, but rather what they should say and what
(among the various ideas communicated) they should believe." Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of
Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 434-35 (1990). As Tracy's observation suggests, however, there
is yet another "hard" question, which Smith's suggestion tends to obscure. It is not whether but
how people should talk; what qualities of character and mind should they bring, or try to bring,
to the task.
22. David Hollenbach, S.J., Civil Society: Beyond the Public-Private Dichotomy, 5 THE RE-
SPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1994-95, 15, 22. One of the religious communities to which Hol-
lenbach refers is the Catholic community. See David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts of the Political
Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 891 (1993):
For example, the Catholic tradition provides some noteworthy evidence that discourse
across the boundaries of diverse communities is both possible and potentially fruitful
when it is pursued seriously. This tradition, in its better moments, has experienced
considerable success in efforts to bridge the divisions that have separated it from other
communities with other understandings of the good life. In the first and second centu-
ries, the early Christian community moved from being a small Palestinian sect to active
encounter with the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. In the fourth century, Augustine
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A central feature of Hollenbach's work is his argument, which I ac-
cept, that the proper role of "public" religious discourse in a society as
religiously pluralistic as the United States is a role to be played, in the
main, much more in public culture-in particular, "in those compo-
nents of civil society that are the primary bearers of cultural meaning
and value-universities, religious communities, the world of the arts,
and serious journalism"-than in public debate specifically about
political issues.23 He writes: "[T]he domains of government and pol-
icy-formation are not generally the appropriate ones in which to argue
controverted theological and philosophical issues . "... 24 But, as Hol-
lenbach goes on to acknowledge, "it is nevertheless neither possible
nor desirable to construct an airtight barrier between politics and
culture." 25
There is, then, this additional reason for not opposing the presenta-
tion of religiously-based moral arguments in public political debate: In
brought biblical faith into dialogue with Stoic and Neoplatonic thought. His efforts
profoundly transformed both Christian and Graeco-Roman thought and practice. In
the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas once again transformed Western Christianity
by appropriating ideas from Aristotle that he had learned from Arab Muslims and from
Jews. In the process he also transformed Aristotelian ways of thinking in fundamental
ways. Not the least important of these transformations was his insistence that the polit-
ical life of a people is not the highest realization of the good of which they are capa-
ble-an insight that lies at the root of constitutional theories of limited government.
And though the Church resisted the liberal discovery of modern freedoms through
much of the modern period, liberalism has been transforming Catholicism once again
through the last half of our own century. The memory of these events in social and
intellectual history as well as the experience of the Catholic Church since the Second
Vatican Council leads me to hope that communities holding different visions of the
good life can get somewhere if they are willing to risk conversation and argument about
these visions. Injecting such hope back into the public life of the United States would
be a signal achievement. Today, it appears to be not only desirable but necessary.
(footnote omitted). For further discussion, see id. at 892-96.
23. Hollenbach, Civil Society, supra note 22, at 22.
Conversation and argument about the common good [including religious conversation
and argument] will not occur initially in the legislature or in the political sphere (nar-
rowly conceived as the domain in which conflict of interest and power are adjudicated).
Rather it will develop freely in those components of civil society that are the primary
bearers of cultural meaning and value-universities, religious communities, the world
of the arts, and serious journalism. It can occur wherever thoughtful men and women
bring their beliefs on the meaning of the good life into intelligent and critical encounter
with understandings of this good held by other peoples with other traditions. In short,
it occurs wherever education about and serious inquiry into the meaning of the good
life takes place.
Id.
24. Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion, supra note 22, at 900. See also Kent
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1019, 1034 (1990) (expressing skepticism about "the promise of religious perspectives being
transformed in what is primarily political debate").
25. Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion, supra note 22, at 900.
1998]LIBERAL DEMOCRACY & RELIGIOUS MORALITY 11
a society as overwhelmingly religious as the United States,26 we do
present and discuss-and we should present and discuss-religiously-
based moral arguments in our public culture.27 Rather than try to do
the impossible-maintain a wall of separation ("an airtight barrier") 28
between the religiously-based moral discourse that inevitably and
properly takes place in public culture ("universities, religious commu-
nities, the world of the arts, and serious journalism") 29 on the one side
and the discourse that takes place in public political debate ("the do-
mains of government and policy-formation") 30 on the other side-we
should simply welcome the presentation of religiously-based moral ar-
guments in all areas of our public culture, including public debate spe-
cifically about contested political choices.31 Indeed, we should not
merely welcome but encourage the presentation of such arguments in
public political debate, so that we can test them there.
But we can and should do more than test religiously-based moral
arguments in public political debate. We should also, in the course of
26. The citizenry of the United States is one of the most religious-perhaps even the most
religious-citizenries of the world's advanced industrial democracies. According to recent pol-
ling data, "[a]n overwhelming 95% of Americans profess belief in God." Richard N. Ostling, In
So Many Gods We Trust, TIME, Jan. 30, 1995, at 72, 72. Moreover, "70% of American adults said
they were members of a church or synagogue." Book Note, Religion and Roe: The Politics of
Exclusion, 108 HARV. L. REV. 495, 498 n.21 (1994) (reviewing ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN
FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993)). See Andrew Greeley,
The Persistence of Religion, 45 CRoss CURRENTS 24 (1995).
27. Cf. Paul G. Stern, A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and Its Relation to Public
Discourse, 99 YALE L.J. 925, 934 (1990):
[W]e can freely and intelligently exercise our freedom of choice on fundamental mat-
ters having to do with our own individual ideals and conceptions of the good only if we
have access to an unconstrained discussion in which the merits of competing moral,
religious, aesthetic, and philosophical values are given a fair opportunity for hearing.
28. See Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion, supra note 22, at 900 and ac-
companying text.
29. See Hollenbach, Civil Society, supra note 22, at 22 and accompanying text.
30. See Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion, supra note 22, at 900 and ac-
companying text.
31. No one suggests that presenting religious arguments in nonpublic political debate-polit-
ical debate around the kitchen table or at a meeting of the local parish's Peace and Justice
Committee-is morally problematic. A practical difficulty with the position that presenting reli-
gious arguments in public political debate is morally problematic is that it might sometimes be
difficult to say when "nonpublic" political debate has crossed the line and become "public."
Moreover, it is no more possible to maintain "an airtight barrier," see Hollenbach, Contexts of
the Political Role of Religion, supra note 22, at 900, between the religiously-based moral dis-
course that takes place in nonpublic political debate and that which takes place in public political
debate than it is to maintain "an airtight barrier," see id., between the religiously-based moral
discourse that takes place in "universities, religious communities, the world of the arts, and seri-
ous journalism," see Hollenbach, Civil Society, supra note 22, at 22, and that which takes place in
"the domains of government and policy-formation." See Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political
Role of Religion, supra note 22, at 900. Why not, then, just welcome the presentation of relig-
iously-based moral arguments in public as well as in relatively nonpublic political debate?
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testing such arguments, let ourselves be tested by them. In a political
community that aspires to be not merely democratic but deliberatively
democratic, there is surely virtue in allowing ourselves to be tested by
arguments with which we, at the outset, disagree. About ten years
ago, in my book Morality, Politics, and Law, I wrote:
If one can participate in politics and law-if one can use or resist
power-only as a partisan of particular moral/religious convictions
about the human, and if politics is and must be in part about the
credibility of such convictions, then we who want to participate,
whether as theorists or activists or both, must examine our own con-
victions self-critically. We must be willing to let our convictions be
tested in ecumenical dialogue with others who do not share them.
We must let ourselves be tested, in ecumenical dialogue, by convic-
tions we do not share. We must, in short, resist the temptations of
infallibilism.32
32. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 183 (1988). See also Jeremy Waldron,
Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 841-42 (1993):
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which they are bound to disa-
gree-and how could any doctrine of public deliberation preclude that?-it does not
follow that such exposure is pointless or oppressive. For one thing, it is important for
people to be acquainted with the views that others hold. Even more important, how-
ever, is the possibility that my own view may be improved, in its subtlety and depth, by
exposure to a religion or a metaphysics that I am initially inclined to reject.... I mean
to draw attention to an experience we all have had at one time or another, of having
argued with someone whose world view was quite at odds with our own, and of having
come away thinking, "I'm sure he's wrong, and I can't follow much of it, but, still, it
makes you think .... " The prospect of losing that sort of effect in public discourse is,
frankly, frightening-terrifying, even, if we are to imagine it being replaced by a form
of "deliberation" that, in the name of "fairness" or "reasonableness" (or worse still,
"balance") consists of bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted without
question on all sides. This is to imagine open-ended public debate reduced to the for-
mal trivia of American televisions networks .... [This] might apply to any religious or
other philosophically contentious intervention. We do not have (and we should not
have) so secure a notion of public consensus, or such stringent requirements of fairness
in debate, as to exclude any view from having its effect in the marketplace of ideas.
Cf. Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1794 (1994) (book review)
(reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)):
It is always possible that learning more about a moral or religious doctrine will lead us
to like it less. But the respect of deliberation and engagement affords a more spacious
public reason than liberalism allows. It is also a more suitable ideal for a pluralist
society. To the extent that our moral and religious disagreements reflect the ultimate
plurality of human goods, a deliberative mode of respect will better enable us to appre-
ciate the distinctive goods our different lives express.
Kent Greenawalt and John Rawls have each defended a position (though not the same posi-
tion) less congenial to the airing of religiously-based moral arguments in public political debate
than the position I have defended here. I have explained elsewhere why I disagree with both
Greenawalt's and Rawls's positions. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 49-61.
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Again, Richard Rorty thinks that it makes sense to "privatiz[e] reli-
gion-[to] keep[ ] it out of... 'the public square,' making it seem bad
taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy. ' 33 Rorty
should think again. Not only are the reasons for wanting to privatize
religion weak, there is also, as I have explained, a strong counter-
vailing case for wanting to "public-ize" religion, not privatize it. We
should make it seem bad taste to sneer when people bring their reli-
gious convictions to bear in public discussions of controversial polit-
ical issues, like homosexuality and abortion. It is not that religious
convictions are brought to bear in public political debate that should
worry us, but how they are sometimes brought to bear (e.g., dogmati-
cally) in public political debate that should. But we should be no less
worried about how fundamental secular convictions are sometimes
brought to bear in public political debate. We should encourage the
presentation of religiously-based moral arguments in the public
square for the reasons I have given here:
O We cannot maintain an airtight separation between religiously-
based moral argument in public culture, which is not merely un-
problematic but important, and such argument in public political
debate.
O Religiously-based moral argument is not necessarily more sec-
tarian or divisive than secular moral argument.
O Religiously-based moral argument is not necessarily less delib-
erative than secular moral argument.
o Given the influential role that religiously-based moral argu-
ment inevitably plays in our politics, it is important that we test
such argument in public political debate.
o Moreover, if our political culture is to be truly and fully deliber-
ative, it is important that we let ourselves be tested by religiously-
based moral argument; it is important, at least, that we not ex-
clude such argument from public political debate and thereby di-
minish the possibility that we will be tested by it.
II. RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS AS A BASIS OF POLITICAL CHOICE
Now, let us turn to a different but related inquiry: Is it proper for
religious believers to rely on religious arguments as a basis of political
choice? Again, by religious arguments, I mean religiously-based
moral arguments, religious arguments about the morality of human
conduct. I want to disaggregate this inquiry, too, into two distinct
33. See Rorty, supra note 14, at 2 and accompanying text.
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questions, the first of which concerns the politics of the United States:
As a matter of American constitutional law, may religious arguments
serve as a basis of political choice? I have addressed this question
elsewhere.34 Here I want only to report my answer, not defend it. In
my judgment, the constitutional requirement that government not "es-
tablish" religion means that no political choice outlawing or otherwise
disfavoring one or another sort of human conduct believed to be im-
moral may be made unless a plausible secular argument or rationale
supports the claim that the conduct is immoral.35 There is an important
exception to this rule, as I will explain in subsection B of this section.36
That there be a plausible secular rationale is not a very consequential
requirement, as a real-world matter, because there are few if any sig-
nificant political controversies where there is not a plausible secular
rationale for a political choice outlawing or otherwise disfavoring
human conduct believed on religious grounds to be immoral.
The second question concerns the politics not just of the United
States but of any liberal democracy: As a matter not of constitutional
law but only of political morality-or perhaps I should say, as a matter
of nonconstitutional political morality-is it proper for religious be-
lievers to rely on religious arguments as a basis of political choice?
Whether or not I am right about the question of constitutional law, 37
the question of political morality remains. One possible answer to the
political-moral question is that neither citizens nor, especially, legisla-
tors or other policymakers should rely on a religious argument in
making a political choice (i.e., a political choice outlawing or other-
wise disfavoring human conduct) unless, in their view, a secular ration-
ale supports the choice, a secular rationale that they themselves find
persuasive.38 A more restrictive answer is that neither citizens nor leg-
islators or other policymakers should rely on a religious argument in
making a political choice even if, in their view, a secular rationale sup-
34. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 33-37.
35. Id.
36. See infra pp. 20-25 and accompanying notes.
37. Douglas Laycock, a leading scholar of religious liberty, has written an essay explaining
why he disagrees with my position that according to the "nonestablishment" norm, there must be
a plausible secular rationale for a political choice outlawing or otherwise disfavoring human
conduct believed to be immoral. See Laycock, supra note 9, at 811-13. In response, I have
explained why I believe Laycock's position to be problematic. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLI-
TICS, supra note 5, at 35-36.
38. I have suggested that those with the principal policymaking authority and responsibility-
in particular, legislators-should ask themselves whether they find a secular rationale persua-
sive. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 123 n.97. By contrast, the issue for a
court evaluating the constitutionality of the choice under the nonestablishment norm is only
whether a plausible secular rationale supports the choice.
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ports the choice. A more permissive answer is that citizens and even
legislators and other policymakers may rely on a religious argument in
making a political choice even if, in their view, no secular rationale
supports the choice.
My answer to the political-moral question is different from, and is
more complicated than, any of the three answers I just listed.
A. False Starts
Why might one be inclined to conclude that government-in partic-
ular, legislators and other policymakers, acting collectively-should
not rely on religious arguments in making political choices about the
morality of human conduct (even if, in their view, a secular rationale
supports the choice; or, at least, unless a secular rationale supports the
choice)? Two reasons come to mind, one of which is moral in charac-
ter, the other of which is practical. Although the moral reason might
be directed specifically at religiously-based moral arguments, it is typi-
cally directed at moral arguments without regard to whether they are
religious or secular. According to the moral reason, for government,
in making a political choice (or, at least a coercive political choice), to
rely on a moral argument that some persons subject to the choice rea-
sonably reject is for government to deny to those persons the respect
that is their due as human beings, or as Rawls has put it, as "free and
equal citizens. ' 39 Variations on this claim appear frequently in essays
presenting "liberal" political-philosophical views. For example, Ste-
phen Macedo has recently written that "[t]he liberal claim is that it is
wrong to seek to coerce people on grounds that they cannot share
without converting to one's faith."'40
This moral position is deeply problematic. The following comment
by William Galston, though it somewhat misconceives the position,
goes to the heart of the matter:
[Charles] Larmore (and Ronald Dworkin before him) may well be
right that the norm of equal respect for persons is close to the core
of contemporary liberalism. But while the (general) concept of
equal respect may be relatively uncontroversial, the (specific) con-
ception surely is not. To treat an individual as person rather than
object is to offer him an explanation. Fine; but what kind of expla-
nation? Larmore seems to suggest that a properly respectful expla-
nation must appeal to beliefs already held by one's interlocutors;
whence the need for neutral dialogue. This seems arbitrary and im-
plausible. I would suggest, rather, that we show others respect
39. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 216-17 (1993).
40. Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending
the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 POL. THEORY 56, 71 (1998).
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when we offer them, as explanation, what we take to be our true
reasons for acting as we do.41
Let me offer two friendly amendments to Galston's comment. First, it
is never to show respect for a human being for one person to offer to
another-for example, for a Nazi to offer to a Jew-a reason to the
effect that "You are not truly or fully human," even if the Nazi sin-
cerely takes that to be his best reason for acting as he does. Second,
Larmore's position, which Galston somewhat misconceives, is that
political "justification must appeal, not simply to the beliefs that the
other happens to have, but to the beliefs he has on the assumption
(perhaps counterfactual) that he affirms the norm of equal respect. ' '42
Nonetheless, it remains altogether obscure why we do not give to
others the respect that is their due as human beings "when we offer
them, as explanation, what we take to be our true reasons for acting as
we do"43 (so long as our reasons do not assert, presuppose, or entail
the inferior humanity of those to whom the explanation is offered).
According to Robert Audi, "If you are fully rational and I cannot con-
vince you of my view by arguments framed in the concepts we share as
rational beings, then even if mine is the majority view I should not
coerce you."'4 4 But why? As Gerald Dworkin has observed:
There is a gap between a premise which requires the state to show
equal concern and respect for all its citizens and a conclusion which
rules out as legitimate grounds for coercion the fact that a majority
believes that conduct is immoral, wicked, or wrong. That gap has
yet to be closed. 45
41. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 109 (1991).
42. Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts-and Second
Thoughts-on LOVE AND POWER, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703, 711 n.23 (1993).
43. GALSTON, supra note 41, at 109. See text accompanying note 41.
44. Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 677, 701 (1993). I wonder what it might mean for one to be "fully rational," and
also what "concepts we share as rational beings."
45. Gerald Dworkin, Equal Respect and the Enforcement of Morality, 7 Soc. PHILO. & POL'Y,
Spring 1990, at 180, 193 (criticizing Ronald Dworkin). See also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 221-22 (1980) (same). I concur in Nicholas Wolterstorff's critique of Audi's
position on this point. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Audi on Religion, Politics, and Liberal Democ-
racy, in RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 145, 159-61 (Robert Audi & Nicholas Wolterstorff
eds., 1997).
A related argument for disfavoring sole reliance on religious arguments in making political
choices about the morality of human conduct is that citizens who do not subscribe to the relevant
religious premise or premises will be, or will feel, politically alienated in consequence of such
reliance. I have explained elsewhere why, in my judgment, this argument is implausible. See
PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 50-52. Cf. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 164-65 n.66
(1995):
[T]he very concept of "alienation," or symbolic exclusion, is difficult to grasp.... How,
if at all, does "alienation" differ from "anger," "annoyance," "frustration," or "disap-
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According to a second, practical reason for wanting government to
forgo reliance on religiously-based moral arguments, the social costs
of government relying on such arguments in making political choices
(or, at least, coercive political choices)-costs that mainly take the
form of increased social instability-are too high. It is implausible to
believe that in the context of a liberal democratic society like the
United States, governmental reliance on religiously-based moral argu-
ments in making political choices (even coercive ones) is invariably
destabilizing, or that it is invariably more destabilizing than govern-
mental reliance on controversial secular moral arguments. Some im-
aginable instances of political reliance on a religiously-based moral
argument might, with other factors, precipitate social instability.
However, "[c]onditions in modern democracies may be so far from
the conditions that gave rise to the religious wars of the sixteenth cen-
tury that we no longer need worry about religious divisiveness as a
source of substantial social conflict.' '46 John Courtney Murray warned
against "project[ing] into the future of the Republic the nightmares,
real or fancied, of the past."'47 As Murray's comment suggests, a rap-
prochement between religion and politics forged in the crucible of a
time or a place very different from our own is not necessarily the best
arrangement for our time and place. "[W]hat principles of restraint, if
any, are appropriate may depend on time and place, on a sense of the
present makeup of a society, of its history, and of its likely
evolution. 48
In my view, neither of the two reasons just examined-neither the
moral reason nor the practical reason-bears the weight of the propo-
pointment" that every person who finds himself in a political minority is likely to feel?
"Alienation" might refer to nothing more than an awareness by an individual that she
belongs to a religious minority, accompanied by the realization that at least on some
kind of issues she is unlikely to be able to prevail in the political process .... That
awareness may be discomforting. But is it the sort of phenomenon for which constitu-
tional law can provide an efficacious remedy? Constitutional doctrine that stifles the
message will not likely alter the reality-or a minority's awareness of that reality.
Smith quotes Mark Tushnet: [N]onadherents who believe that they are excluded from the polit-
ical community are merely expressing the disappointment felt by everyone who has lost a fair
fight in the arena of politics." Id. (quoting Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN.
L. REV. 701, 712 (1986)).
46. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1083, 1096 (1990) (footnote
omitted). Solum is stating the argument, not making the argument. Indeed, Solum is wary of
the argument. See id. at 1096-97. Solum cites, as an instance of the argument, Stephen L. Carter,
The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 939 (1989). For another instance,
see Maimon Schwarzschild, Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and
Water or Sometimes More Like Rum and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 903 (1993)..
47. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 23-24 (1960).
48. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS, supra note 7, at 130.
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sition that government should not rely solely on religious arguments
in making political choices about the morality of human conduct
(much less the proposition that it should not rely even partly on such
arguments). More generally, nothing in the morality or ethics of lib-
eral democracy-at least, nothing I can discern-requires religious be-
lievers, in making political choices about the morality of human
conduct (or other political choices), to forgo sole reliance on religious
arguments just in virtue of the fact that the arguments are religious. I
agree with Nicholas Wolterstorff and others, like Douglas Laycock
and Michael McConnell, that liberal-democratic morality, properly
understood, requires no such thing.49 I therefore disagree with John
Rawls and others, like Robert Audi, on this important point, as I have
explained elsewhere.50 According to Wolterstorff:
[T]he ethic of the citizen in a liberal democracy imposes no restric-
tions on the reasons people offer in their discussion of political is-
sues in the public square, and likewise imposes none on the reasons
they have for their political decisions and actions. If the position
adopted, and the manner in which it is acted on, are compatible
with the concept of liberal democracy, and if the discussion concern-
ing the issue is conducted with civility, then citizens are free to offer
and act on whatever reasons they find compelling. I regard it as an
important implication of the concept of liberal democracy that citi-
zens should have this freedom-that in this regard they should be
allowed to act as they see fit. Liberal democracy implies, as I see it,
that there should be no censorship in this regard. 51
Although I agree that liberal-democratic morality does not require
religious believers, in making political choices about the morality of
human conduct, to forgo sole reliance on religious arguments just be-
cause the arguments are religious, I do not stop there. After all, reli-
gious believers might have one or more reasons to forgo sole reliance
on religious arguments, or some religious arguments, other than a rea-
son rooted in liberal-democratic morality. And, as it happens, many
religious believers do have such a reason. In making a political choice
about the morality of human conduct, and in the absence of an in-
dependent secular rationale for the choice-a secular rationale that
they themselves accept-many legislators and other policymakers and
even ordinary citizens have good reason to forgo reliance on one sort
of religious argument about the morality of human conduct: religious
arguments about the requirements of human well-being.
49. Wolterstorff, supra note 45, at 147. See Laycock, supra note 9, at 798-807; Michael W.
McConnell, Correspondence: Getting Along, FIRST THINGS, June-July 1996, at 2.
50. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 54-61.
51. Wolterstorff, supra note 45, at 147.
[Vol. 48:1
1998] LIBERAL DEMOCRACY & RELIGIOUS MORALITY 19
Religious arguments about the morality of human conduct typically
address one or both of two fundamental moral issues. First, are all
human beings sacred (or "inviolable"52), or only some; does the well-
being of every human being merit our respect and concern, or the
well-being only of some human beings? (There is a related question,
but it is really just a variation on the question about the sacredness vel
non of all human beings: Who is a human being; that is, what members
of the species Homo sapiens are truly, fully human? Women? Non-
whites? Jews?) 53 Second, what are the requirements of human well-
being; what is friendly to human well-being, and what is hostile to it;
what is good for human beings, and what is bad?5 4 There are, corre-
spondingly, two basic kinds of religious arguments about the morality
of human conduct: religious arguments about who among all human
beings are sacred and religious arguments about the requirements of
human well-being.
52. Dworkin writes:
Some readers . . . will take particular exception to the term "sacred" because it will
suggest to them that the conviction I have in mind is necessarily a theistic one. I shall
try to explain why it is not, and how it may be, and commonly is, interpreted in a
secular as well as in a conventionally religious way. But "sacred" does have inelimin-
able religious connotations for many people, and so I will sometimes use "inviolable"
instead to mean the same thing, in order to emphasize the availability of that secular
interpretation.
Ronald Dworkin, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND IN-
DIVIDUAL FREEDOM 25 (1993).
53. Cast as the claim that only some persons are human beings, the claim that only some
human beings are sacred has been, and remains, quite common. According to Nazi ideology, for
example, the Jews were pseudohumans. See Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the Univer-
sal Declaration, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 357, 363 (1993). There are countless other examples, past and
present.
Serbian murderers and rapists do not think of themselves as violating human rights.
For they are not doing these things to fellow human beings, but to Muslims. They are
not being inhuman, but rather are discriminating between the true humans and the
pseudohumans. They are making the same sort of distinction as the Crusaders made
between the humans and infidel dogs, and the Black Muslims make between humans
and blue-eyed devils. [Thomas Jefferson] was able both to own slaves and to think it
self-evident that all men were endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights.
He had convinced himself that the consciousness of Blacks, like that of animals, "par-
ticipates more of sensation than reflection." Like the Serbs, Mr. Jefferson did not think
of himself as violating human rights.
The Serbs take themselves to be acting in the interests of true humanity by purifying
the world of pseudohumanity.
Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RirTS: THE OX-
FORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993 111, 112 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993) (footnote
omitted). See id. at 125.
54. The first question is about who has full moral status: Who is sacred (inviolable, etc.)? The
second question is about what is good for those with full moral status, or about what is bad for
them-about what is friendly to their well-being, or about what is hostile it. Thanks to Laura
Underkuffler for suggesting this clarification.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The claim I want to develop and defend here is that in making a
political choice about the morality of human conduct, legislators and
other policymakers and even ordinary citizens should forgo reliance
on a religious argument about human well-being-at least, they
should be exceedingly wary about relying on such a religious argu-
ment-unless an independent secular argument that they themselves ac-
cept, that they themselves find persuasive, reaches the same conclusion
about the requirements of human well-being as the religious argument.
As I am about to explain, however, religious argument of the first
sort-religious arguments about who among all human beings are sa-
cred, which I will call simply "religious arguments about human
worth"-merits separate treatment. There is finally no good reason
why legislators, other policymakers, or citizens, in making a political
choice about the morality of human conduct, should be wary about
relying on the claim that each and every human being is sacred even if
in their judgment the only persuasive argument (i.e., persuasive to
them) that supports the claim is religious.
B. Religious Arguments about Human Worth
The only claim about human worth on which government in the
United States constitutionally may rely is that all human beings (or, at
least, all born human beings), and not just some (e.g., white persons,
men, Christians), are truly, fully human and, as such, are sacred.55
Moreover, the only claim about human worth consistent with the in-
ternational law of human rights is that each and every human being is
sacred.56 Claims to the effect that all human beings are sacred are
quite common in the United States, where the most influential reli-
gious traditions teach that all human beings are children of God and
sisters and brothers to one another. As Hilary Putnam has noted, the
moral image central to what Putnam calls the Jerusalem-based reli-
gions "stresse[s] equality and also fraternity, as in the metaphor of the
whole human race as One Family, of all women and men as sisters and
brothers. ' '57 The opening passage of a statement, in 1995, by the
55. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS?: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, (forthcoming, Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (manuscript at ch.
3 on file with author).
56. That every human being (or, at least, every born human being) is sacred is represented in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 2) by this language: "Everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948).
57. HILARY PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 60-61 (1987).
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Catholic bishops of Florida, on the controversial political issue of wel-
fare reform, is illustrative:
The founding document of our nation says that all are endowed by
their Creator with unalienable [sic] rights, including the right to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. And as Jesus has told us:
"Amen, I say to you, whatever you did for the least of these broth-
ers and sisters of mine you did for me." 58
Moreover, claims that all human beings are sacred are quite common
not just in the United States, but throughout the world. Indeed, the
first part of the idea of human rights-an idea that has emerged in
international law since the end of World War II and that is embraced
by many persons throughout the world who are not religious believers
as well as by many who are-is that each and every human being is
sacred.59
The proposition that all human beings are sacred is, for many per-
sons, a religiously-based tenet.60 However, many persons who are not
religious believers embrace the proposition as a fundamental principle
of morality. The proposition is an axiom of many secular moralities as
well as a fundamental principle, in one or another version, of many
58. Florida Bishops, Promoting Meaningful Welfare Reform, 24 ORIGINS 609, 611 (1995)
(quoting Matthew 25:40). See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE FOR ALL: A PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECON-
OMY v (1986):
This letter is a personal invitation to Catholics to use the resources of our faith, the
strength of our economy, and the opportunities of our democracy to shape a society
that better protects the dignity and basic rights of our sisters and brothers, both in this
land and around the world.
(Emphasis added). By "our sisters and brothers," the Catholic bishops meant, not "our fellow
Catholics" or even "our fellow Christians," but "all human beings."
59. The second part of the idea is that, because every human being is sacred, there are certain
things that ought not to be done to any human being and certain other things that ought to be
done for every human being. I have discussed the idea of human rights at length elsewhere. See
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES (1998).
60. In an essay on the spirituality of the Talmud, Ben Zion Bokser and Baruch M. Bokser
wrote: "From this conception of man's place in the universe comes the sense of the supreme
sanctity of all human life. 'He who destroys one person has dealt a blow at the entire universe,
and he who saves or sustains one person has sustained the whole world."' Ben Zion Bokser &
Baruch M. Bokser, Introduction: The Spirituality of the Talmud, in THE TALMUD: SELECTED
WRITINGS 7, 30 (1989) (quoting Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5). They continue:
The sanctity of life is not a function of national origin, religious affiliation, or social
status. In the sight of God, the humble citizen is the equal of the person who occupies
the highest office. As one talmudist put it: "Heaven and earth I call to witness, whether
it be an Israelite or pagan, man or woman, slave or maidservant, according to the work
of every human being doth the Holy Spirit rest upon him." ... As the rabbis put it:
"We are obligated to feed non-Jews residing among us even as we feed Jews; we are
obligated to visit their sick even as we visit the Jewish sick; we are obligated to attend
to the burial of their dead even as we attend to the burial of the Jewish dead."
Id. at 30-31.
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religious moralities. The widespread secular embrace of the idea of
human rights is conclusive evidence of that fact. As Ronald Dworkin
has written: "We almost all accept ... that human life in all its forms is
sacred. . . . For some of us, this is a matter of religious faith; for
others, of secular but deep philosophical belief."' 61 Indeed, the propo-
sition that every human being is sacred is axiomatic for so many secu-
lar moralities that many secular moral philosophers have come to
speak of "the moral point of view" as that view according to which
"every person [has] some sort of equal status. ' 62 Bernard Williams
has noted that
it is often thought that no concern is truly moral unless it is marked
by this universality. For morality, the ethical constituency is always
the same: the universal constituency. An allegiance to a smaller
group, the loyalties to family or country, would have to be justified
from the outside inward, by an argument that explained how it was
a good thing that people should have allegiances that were less than
universal. 63
I reported earlier in this essay that, in my judgment, the "nonestab-
lishment" norm of the United States Constitution forbids government
to rely on a religious argument in making a political choice outlawing
or otherwise disfavoring human conduct believed immoral unless a
plausible secular rationale supports the choice. 64 That report was not
entirely accurate; let me now amend it. I have elsewhere called atten-
tion to the possibility that there is no plausible or even intelligible
secular argument that every human being is sacred.65 The only intelli-
gible arguments to that effect are religious in character. (That an ar-
gument is intelligible does not mean that it is persuasive or even
plausible.) Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that no plausible
secular argument supports the claim that every human being is sacred.
It would be silly to insist that because no plausible secular argument
supports the claim that every human being is sacred, the nonestablish-
ment norm forbids government, in making a political choice about the
morality of human conduct, to rely on the claim that every human
61. Ronald Dworkin, Life is Sacred. That's the Easy Part, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1993, (Maga-
zine), at 36. Cf. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 52, at 25 (acknowledging that "sacred"
is often used in a theistic sense, but it can be used in a secular sense as well). I have criticized
Dworkin's conception of "sacred." See PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at
25-29.
62. JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE
239 (1986).
63. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AN1) THE LIMrrs OF PHILOSOPHY 14 (1985).
64. See supra p. 14 and notes 34-35.
65. See PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 11-41 ("Is the Idea of Human
Rights Ineliminably Religious?"). I
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being is sacred. After all, the proposition that all human beings (non-
white as well as white, women as well as men, etc.) are truly, fully
human and, as such, are sacred is a fundamental part of the Constitu-
tion itself, in particular, the Fourteenth Amendment. In a review of
my book, Religion in Politics, Kurt Lash has written: "[Perry] never
explains why this religious belief [i.e., that every human being is sa-
cred], but not others, constitutionally may be imposed on nonbe-
lievers. ' '66 I hope the explanation is now clear: The proposition that
every human being is sacred is a fundamental part of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.67 The Constitu-
tion not only does not forbid government in making political choices
to rely on the proposition, it forbids government to rely on the con-
trary proposition that some persons are not sacred.
Similarly, it would be silly to insist that (apart from what the Consti-
tution might or might not forbid), citizens, legislators, and other
policymakers should therefore forgo reliance on the claim that every
human being is sacred unless, in their judgment, a persuasive (to
them) secular argument supports the claim. Whether or not a persua-
sive secular argument supports the claim-and so, even if none does-
the proposition that all human beings are sacred is a fundamental con-
stituent of the moral culture of the United States. It is a fundamental
moral conviction of Americans that, in the words of our Declaration
of Independence, all human beings "are created equal, and endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights .... -68 Therefore, we
must conclude that, in making a political choice outlawing or other-
wise disfavoring human conduct believed immoral, government may,
under the nonestablishment norm, and legislators and others may, as a
nonconstitutional matter, rely on the claim that every human being is
sacred whether or not any persuasive or even plausible secular argu-
ment supports the claim about the true and full humanity and sacred-
ness of every human being.69 This conclusion should trouble few if any
persons who are committed to liberal democracy, however, even if
66. Kurt T. Lash, Civilizing Religion, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1100, 1109 (1997).
67. For a defense of this claim, see PERRY, JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS, supra note 55
(manuscript at ch. 3) (entitled The Fourteenth Amendment: What Norms Did "We the People"
Establish?).
68. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
69. As a nonconstitutional matter, may legislators or others, in making a political choice out-
lawing or otherwise disfavoring human conduct believed immoral, rely on a claim that only some
human beings are sacred-or, equivalently, that only some human beings (e.g., white persons)
are truly, fully human-even if, in their view, no persuasive secular argument supports the
claim? Such a claim is flatly inconsistent with the morality of liberal democracy, according to
which each and every human being has equal moral status. See infra note 70 and accompanying
text.
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they are religious nonbelievers, because the proposition that each and
every human being is sacred is not only embedded, in one form or
another, in many different religious traditions;70 it is also axiomatic for
most persons, including most religious nonbelievers, who are commit-
ted to liberal democracy as the morally best form of government and,
more broadly, to the idea of human rights. Any argument, including
any religious argument, that only some human beings are sacred (invi-
olable, etc.) is contrary both to liberal democracy and to the idea of
human rights.
[P]erhaps the litmus test of whether the reader is in any sense a
liberal or not is Gladstone's foreign-policy speeches....
In [one such speech,] taken from the late 1870s, around the time
of the Midlothian campaign, [Gladstone] reminded his listeners that
"the sanctity of life in the hill villages of Afghanistan among the
winter snows, is as inviolable in the eye of almighty God as can be
your own ... that the law of mutual love is not limited by the shores
of this island, is not limited by the boundaries of Christian civiliza-
tion; that it passes over the whole surface of the earth, and em-
braces the meanest along with the greatest in its unmeasured
scope." By all means smile at the oratory. But anyone who sneers
at the underlying message is not a liberal in any sense of that word
worth preserving.71
It remains the case, however, that the nonestablishment norm of the
United States Constitution forbids government to rely on a religious
argument of the other basic sort-a religious argument about human
well-being-in making a political choice outlawing or otherwise disfa-
voring human conduct believed immoral unless a plausible secular ra-
tionale supports the choice. 72 That, at least, is my position about how
70. See ROBERT TRAER, FAITH IN HUMAN RIGHTS: SUPPORT IN RELIGIOUS TRADTIONS FOR A
GLOBAL STRUGGLE (1991); THE ETHICS OF WORLD RELIGIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Hans
King & Jirgen Moltmann eds., 1990); HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS (Leroy S.
Rouner ed., 1988); HUMAN RIGHTS IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS (Arlene Swidler ed., 1982);
WORLD RELIGIONS AND HUMAN LIBERATION (Dan Cohn-Sherbok ed., 1992).
71. Samuel Brittan, Making Common Cause?: How Liberals Differ, and What They Ought To
Agree On, TIMES LIT. SuPP., Sept. 20, 1996, at 3, 4.
72. A qualification is needed here. As I have explained elsewhere, the nonestablishment
norm forbids government to base political choices on secular arguments of a certain sort,
namely, secular arguments that one or more religious tenets are more authentically American,
more representative of the sentiments of the community, or otherwise "better," than one or
more competing religious or nonreligious tenets. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note
5, at 14-16. When I refer, in describing the requirements of the nonestablishment norm, to a
"secular" argument or rationale, I do not mean to include arguments of the sort described in the
preceding sentence, but only those that do not in any way value one or more religious tenets,
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we should understand, in the present context, the implications of the
nonestablishment norm. In the next section of this essay, I inquire
whether, apart from what the Constitution might forbid, citizens and,
especially, legislators and other policymakers should forgo reliance on
a religious argument about the requirements of human well-being in
making a political choice outlawing or otherwise disfavoring human
conduct believed immoral if, in their view, no secular argument that
they themselves find persuasive reaches the same conclusion about
those requirements as the religious argument.73
C. Religious Arguments about Human Well-Being
Again, arguments about the requirements of human well-being are
the second basic kind of religious argument about the morality of
human conduct: in particular, arguments about what is truly good for
human beings, whether all human beings or only some, or about what
is truly bad for them; about what is conducive to or even constitutive
of authentic human well-being, or about what impedes or even de-
stroys authentic human well-being; about what must not be done to,
or about what must be done for, a human being (including oneself) if
one is to achieve well-being. (Achieving well-being is not an either/or
matter, but rather a matter of degree.) In making a political choice
outlawing or otherwise disfavoring human conduct believed immoral,
should legislators and other policymakers and even ordinary citizens
refrain from relying on a religious argument about the requirements
of human well-being absent a persuasive (to them) secular argument
that reaches the same conclusion about those requirements?
As I am about to explain, for most religious believers in the United
States, at least, and probably for most religious believers in other lib-
eral democracies, especially liberal democracies that are religiously
that do not claim that one or more religious beliefs are better, along one or another dimension of
value, than one or more competing religious or nonreligious beliefs.
73. In the United States, the political controversy about abortion-the debate about what
public policy regarding abortion should be-looms large in the background, it looms large as a
subtext, of the debate about the proper role of religion in politics. As much as any other con-
temporary political controversy, and more than most, the abortion controversy is a principal, if
often unspoken, occasion of the debate about religion in politics. See ELIZABETH MENSCH &
ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993).
It is noteworthy that were a government to choose to outlaw abortion, it would not have to
rely on a religious argument about the requirements of human well-being. (Therefore, the
nonestablishment norm, at least, does not stand in the way of restrictive abortion legislation.)
This is illustrated by the fact that the most influential religious voice in the United States on the
"pro-life" side of the debate about what public policy regarding abortion should be-the voice of
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops-does not rely on a religious argument about the
requirements of human well-being.
See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 70-72.
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pluralistic, the persuasiveness or soundness of any religious argument
about human well-being depends, or should depend, partly on there
being at least one persuasive secular argument (i.e., one secular argu-
ment that they themselves find persuasive) that reaches the same con-
clusion about the requirements of human well-being as the religious
argument. (Some theologically conservative Christians-in particular,
"fundamentalist" Christians and some "evangelical" Christians-will
disagree. I address such Christians in the next section of this essay.)
A qualification is necessary here. Imagine a religious argument ac-
cording to which perfect human well-being consists, at least in part, in
union with God and therefore requires, among other things, prayer or
other spiritual practice conducive to achieving such union. By defini-
tion, no "secular" argument can reach such a conclusion about the
nature or requirements of human well-being. But, as I have explained
elsewhere, no government committed to the ideal of nonestablishment
will take any action based on the view that a practice is or practices
are, as religious practice-as practice embedded in and expressive of
one or more religious beliefs-truer or more efficacious spiritually or
otherwise better than one or more other religious or nonreligious
practices or than no religious practice at all. 74 The United States is
constitutionally committed to the ideal of nonestablishment. More-
over, no government committed to freedom of religion, as a liberal
democracy is, will coerce its citizens to engage in any religious prac-
tices. Nonetheless, to be as precise as possible: The persuasiveness of
any religious argument about human well-being-any religious argu-
ment, that is, on which a government committed not to discriminate in
favor of religious practice would be prepared to rely-should depend
in part on there being at least one sound secular argument that
reaches the same conclusion as the religious argument. At least, no
religious argument about human well-being should be deemed suffi-
ciently strong to ground a political choice, least of all a coercive polit-
ical choice, unless a persuasive secular argument reaches the same
conclusion about the requirements of human well-being.
Why should the persuasiveness of every religious argument about
human well-being (on which a government committed not to discrimi-
nate in favor of religious practice would be prepared to rely) depend
partly on there being at least one sound secular route to the religious
argument's conclusion about the requirements of human well-being?
A "religious" argument about human well-being-like a religious ar-
gument about anything-is, as I wrote earlier, an argument that relies
74. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 20-21.
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on (among the other things it relies on) a religious belief: an argument
that presupposes the truth of a religious belief and includes that belief
as one of its essential premises. (Again, a "religious" belief is, for
present purposes, either the belief that God exists-"God" in the
sense of a transcendent reality that is the source, the ground, and the
end of everything else-or a belief about the nature, the activity, or
the will of God.) The paradigmatic religious argument about human
well-being relies principally on a claim about what God has revealed.
Such an argument might be made by someone who believes that we
human beings are too fallen (too broken, too corrupt) to achieve
much insight into our own nature and that the safest inferences about
human nature, about the requirements of human well-being, are based
on God's revelation. 75 However, religious believers-even religious
believers within the same religious tradition-do not always agree
with one another about what God has revealed. Moreover, many reli-
gious believers understand that human beings are quite capable not
only of making honest mistakes, but even of deceiving themselves
about what God has revealed, including what God might have re-
vealed about the requirements of human well-being. 76
Therefore, and as many religious believers understand, an argument
about human well-being-about what is truly good for (all or some)
human beings, or about what is truly bad for them-that is grounded
on a claim about what God has revealed is highly suspect if there is no
secular route to the religious argument's conclusion about the require-
ments of human well-being. So long as no persuasive secular argu-
ment supports the conclusion about the requirements of human well-
being reached by a religious argument of the kind in question, the
religious argument is problematic. (This is not to say either that the
existence of a persuasive secular argument entails the persuasiveness
75. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. For a description of the religious mindset that
yields such a religious argument, see JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUG-
GLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 120-21 (1991).
76. Charles Curran, the eminent Catholic moral theologian, has raised a helpful question, in
correspondence, about my "emphasis on human well-being and human nature. Some people
might criticize that [emphasis] as being too anthropocentric and not theocentric enough for a
truly Protestant position .... The primary question perhaps even in the reformed tradition is
what is the will of God and not what is human flourishing or human nature." Letter to Michael
J. Perry, Aug. 7, 1995. However, given two assumptions that few Christians would want to deny,
the distinction between doing "what God wills or commands us to do" and doing "what fulfills
our nature" is quite false. The two assumptions are, first, that human beings have a nature-
indeed, a nature fashioned by God-and, second, that it is God's will that human beings act so as
to fulfill or perfect their nature. As Bernard Williams has observed, "[preferred ethical catego-
ries] may be said to be given by divine command or revelation; in this form, if it is not combined
with a grounding in human nature, the explanation will not lead us anywhere except into what
Spinoza called 'the asylum of ignorance."' WILLIAMS, supra note 63, at 96.
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of the religious argument or that the nonexistence of a persuasive sec-
ular argument entails that the religious argument is incorrect.) In-
deed, in the absence of any persuasive secular argument, the religious
argument is of doubtful soundness for anyone who believes, as do
most Christians, for example, that no fundamental truth about the ba-
sic requirements of human well-being is unavailable to any (rational)
human being-that every such truth, even if available only to some
human beings by the grace of "supernatural" revelation, is nonethe-
less available "in principle" to every human being by virtue of so-
called "natural" reason. 77 The Roman Catholic religious-moral tradi-
tion has long embraced that position:78
[St. Thomas] Aquinas remained ... convinced that morality is es-
sentially rational conduct, and as such it must be accessible, at least
in principle, to human reason and wisdom .... In the teaching of
Aquinas, then, the purpose of Revelation, so far as morality is con-
cerned, appears to be essentially remedial, not absolutely necessary
for man ... [T]he Christian revelation contains in its moral teaching
no substantial element over and above what is accessible to human
reason without such revelation .... Revelation as such has nothing
in matters of moral behaviour to add to the best of human thinking
79
Aquinas's enormous influence on the Christian religious-moral tradi-
tion extends far beyond just Catholic Christianity. Christians gener-
ally, and not just Catholics, would "want to argue (at least, many of
them would) that the Christian revelation does not require us to inter-
pret the nature of man in ways for which there is otherwise no warrant
but rather affords a deeper understanding of man as he essentially
i s . , 8o
77. "In principle," because
[t]he participation by man in God's eternal law through knowledge . . . can be cor-
rupted and depraved in such a way that the natural knowledge of good is darkened by
passions and the habits of sin. For Aquinas, then, not all the conclusions of natural law
are universally known, and the more one descends from the general to the particular,
the more possible it is for reason to be unduly influenced by the emotions, or by cus-
toms, or by fallen nature.
JOHN MAHONEY, S.J., THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE ROMAN CATHO-
LIC TRADITION 105-06 (1987) (footnote omitted).
78. For an illuminating recounting, see id. at 103-15.
79. Id. at 106-07, 109. Mahoney then adds: "[B]ut such human moral thinking is by no means
always or invariably at its best." Id. at 109.
80. Basil Mitchell, Should Law Be Christian?, LAW & JUST., No. 96/97 (1988), at 12, 21. More-
over, as the American philosopher Robert Audi (who identifies himself as a Christian) has ex-
plained, "good secular arguments for moral principles may be better reasons to believe those
principles to be divinely enjoined than theological arguments for the principles, based on scrip-
ture or tradition." Audi, Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics, in RELIGION IN
THE PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 45, at 1, 20-21. This is because the latter-in particular, scrip-
ture-based and tradition-based religious arguments-"seem (even) more subject than the former
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No religious argument about human well-being-indeed, no relig-
iously-based moral argument of any kind-is a persuasive basis of
political choice for religious nonbelievers. But even for religious be-
lievers-in particular, for religious believers, whether Christian or not,
who accept what has been the dominant Christian understanding of
the relation between "revelation" and "reason"-any religious argu-
ment about human well-being should be a highly suspect basis of
political choice if no persuasive secular argument reaches the same
conclusion about the requirements of human well-being as the reli-
gious argument. Given the demonstrated, ubiquitous human propen-
sity to be mistaken and even to deceive oneself about what God has
revealed, the absence of a persuasive secular argument in support of a
claim about the requirements of human well-being fairly supports a
presumption that the claim is probably false, that it is probably the
defective yield of that demonstrated human propensity. At least, it
fairly supports a presumption that the claim is an inappropriate
ground of political choice, especially coercive political choice.
A religious community might try to insulate itself from such a pre-
sumption by means of one or more doctrines about its own privileged
and perhaps even infallible insight into God's revelation, including
God's revelation about the requirements of human well-being. But
any such doctrine is destined to seem to outsiders to the community-
and, depending on the degree of historical self-awareness among the
members of the community, even to some insiders, and perhaps to
many of them-as little more than a prideful and self-serving strata-
gem.81 In any event, no such doctrine can be politically effective in a
to cultural influences that may distort scripture or tradition or both; more vulnerable to misinter-
pretation of religious or other texts or to their sheer corruption across time and translation; and
more liable to bias stemming from political or other non-religious aims." Id. at 21. (Christian-
ity's acceptance of slavery comes to mind here-an acceptance that persisted for most of the two
millennia of Christianity. See infra note 81.) Audi concludes that: "[giranting, then, that theol-
ogy and religious inspiration can be sources of ethical insight, we can also reverse this traditional
idea: one may sometimes be better off trying to understand God through ethics than ethics
through theology." Audi, supra, at 22 (footnote omitted). (One can accept Audi's point and
nonetheless believe that there is no intelligible secular argument for the foundational moral
proposition that each and every human being is sacred. See supra note 65.)
81. Discussing usury, marriage, slavery, and religious freedom, John Noonan has
demonstrated:
Wide shifts in the teaching of moral duties, once presented as part of Christian doctrine
by the magisterium, have occurred. In each case one can see the displacement of a
principle or principles that had been taken as dispositive-in the case of usury, that a
loan confers no right to profit; in the case of marriage, that all marriages are indissolu-
ble; in the case of slavery, that war gives a right to enslave and that ownership of a slave
gives title to the slave's offspring; in the case of religious liberty, that error has no rights
and that fidelity to the Christian faith may be physically enforced .... In the course of
this displacement of one set of principles, what was forbidden became lawful (the cases
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society as religiously pluralistic as the United States. Indeed, no reli-
gious community that fails to honor the ideal of self-critical rationality
can play a meaningful role in the politics of a religiously pluralistic
democracy like the United States.8 2 As Richard John Neuhaus has
warned, "So long as Christian teaching claims to be a privileged form
of discourse that is exempt from the scrutiny of critical reason, it will
understandably be denied a place in discussions that are authentically
public. '83 Listen, too, to J. Bryan Hehir, who, as the principal drafter
of the U.S. Catholic Bishops' 1983 letter on nuclear deterrence, 84 has
some experience in the matter:
[R]eligiously based insights, values and arguments at some point
must be rendered persuasive to the wider civil public. There is legit-
imacy to proposing a sectarian argument within the confines of a
religious community, but it does violence to the fabric of pluralism
to expect acceptance of such an argument in the wider public arena.
When a religious moral claim will affect the wider public, it should
be proposed in a fashion which that public can evaluate, accept or
reject on its own terms. The [point] . . . is not to banish religious
insight and argument from public life[, but only to] establish[ ] a test
for the religious communities to meet: to probe our commitments
deeply and broadly enough that we can translate their best insights
to others. 85
of usury and marriage); what was permissible became unlawful (the case of slavery);
and what was required became forbidden (the persecution of heretics).
John T. Noonan Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 662, 669 (1993).
See also Sedn Fagan, S.M., Interpreting the Catechism, 44 DOCTRINE & LIFE 412, 416-17 (1994):
A catechism is supposed to "explain," but this one does not say why Catholics have to
take such a rigid, absolutist stand against artificial contraception because it is papal
teaching, but there is no reference to the explicit centuries-long papal teaching that
Jews and heretics go to hell unless they convert to the Catholic faith, or to Pope Leo X,
who declared that the burning of heretics is in accord with the will of the Holy Spirit.
Six different popes justified and authorised the use of slavery. Pius XI, in an encyclical
at least as important as Humane Vitae, insisted that co-education is erroneous and per-
nicious, indeed against nature. The Catechism's presentation of natural law gives the
impression that specific moral precepts can be read off from physical human nature,
without any awareness of the fact that our very understanding of "nature" and what is
"natural" can be coloured by our culture.
82. On self-critical rationality, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF
RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, at 52-65 (1991). I suppose that few if any
traditions, religious or otherwise, fail to practice self-critical rationality to some extent. The
question is whether and to what extent, in a particular tradition, the ideal of self-critical rational-
ity is central or marginal, is vigorously affirmed or vigorously repressed.
83. Richard John Neuhaus, Reason Public and Private: The Pannenberg Project, FIRST
THINGS, Mar. 1992, at 55, 57.
84. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S
PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1983).
85. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 78 (quoting Bryan Hehir). The Dutch
theologian, Edward Schillebeeckx, who is Catholic, has written: "Even when their fundamental
inspiration comes from a religious belief in God, ethical norms ... must be rationally grounded.
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The drafters of The Williamsburg Charter, a group that included many
prominent religious believers, have articulated a similar contention:
"Arguments for public policy should be more than private convictions
shouted out loud. For persuasion to be principled, private convictions
should be translated into publicly accessible claims. Such public
claims should be made publicly accessible ... because they must en-
gage those who do not share the same private convictions.... 86
Richard Neuhaus, who was instrumental in the drafting of The Wil-
liamsburg Charter, has cautioned that "publicly assertive religious
forces will have to learn that the remedy for the naked public square is
not naked religion in public. They will have to develop a mediating
language by which ultimate truths can be related to the penultimate
and prepenultimate questions of political and legal contest. '87
Again, any religious community that would play a meaningful role
in the politics of a religiously pluralistic democracy like the United
States must honor the ideal of self-critical rationality. Insisting on a
persuasive secular argument in support of a claim about human well-
being is obviously one important way for the members of a religious
community to honor the ideal of self-critical rationality; it is one im-
portant way for them to conform their practice to the ideal. More-
over, it is one important way-and, indeed, a relatively ecumenical
way-for the citizens of a religiously pluralistic democracy, including
citizens who are religious believers, to test the various statements
about what God has revealed, including statements about God's re-
vealed will, that are sometimes articulated in public political debate;
for example, statements that certain biblical passages "'prove' that
heterosexuality is God's exclusive intention for human sexuality and
that homosexuality is an abomination before God."'88
None of the participants in [religiously-based moral discourse] can hide behind an 'I can see
what you don't see' and then require [the] others to accept this norm straight out." EDWARD
SCHILLEBEECKX, THE SCHILLEBEECKX READER 263 (Robert Schreiter ed., 1984). Even if we
assume for the sake of argument that Schillebeeckx's principle should not govern moral dis-
course in all contexts-for example, in the context of a small, monistic, charismatic religious
community-the principle should certainly govern moral discourse in some contexts, especially
in the context of a large, pluralistic, democratic political community like the United States.
86. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER: A NATIONAL CELEBRATION AND REAFFIRMATION OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES 22 (1988).
87. Richard John Neuhaus, Nihilism Without the Abyss: Law, Rights, and Transcendent Good,
5 J.L. & RELIGION 53, 62 (1987). In commenting on this passage, Stanley Hauerwas has said that
"[riather than condeming [sic] the Moral Majority, Neuhaus seeks to help them enter the public
debate by basing their appeals on principles that are accessible to the public." Stanley Hauerwas,
A Christian Critique of Christian America, in RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 110, 118 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988).
88. Siker, supra note 12, at 184. For Siker's criticism of such interpretations, see id. at 184-91.
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I have just indicated why, in making political choices about the mo-
rality of human conduct, legislators, other policymakers, and even or-
dinary citizens should not rely on-at least, they should be
exceedingly wary about relying on-a religious argument about
human well-being if, in their view, no secular argument that is persua-
sive to them reaches the same conclusion about the requirements of
human well-being. Should we go further and conclude that legislators
and others should not rely on a religious argument about human well-
being even if, in their view, a persuasive secular argument does reach
the same conclusion? Should legislators and others rely only on the
persuasive secular argument? Our historical experience teaches us to
be deeply skeptical about government-about politics, about the po-
litically powerful-acting as an arbiter of religious truth.89 Politics is
not a domain conducive to the discernment of theological truth; it is,
however, a domain extremely vulnerable to the manipulative exploita-
tion of theological controversy. (Theologically conservative Chris-
tians should know this as well as anyone else.) Nonetheless, it seems
unrealistic to insist that legislators and others support a political
choice about the morality of human well-being only on the basis of a
secular argument they find persuasive if they also find persuasive a
religious argument that supports the choice. How could such a legisla-
tor be sure that she was relying only on the secular argument, putting
no weight whatsoever on the religious argument? She could ask
whether she would support the choice even if the religious argument
were absent, solely on the basis of the secular argument. However,
trying to ferret out the truth by means of such counterfactual specula-
tion is perilous at best and would probably be, as often as not, self-
deceiving and self-serving. 90
More fundamentally, the relevant question for a legislator (or other
policymaker or citizen) is not whether she would find persuasive a sec-
ular argument about human well-being if she did not already find per-
suasive a religious argument that reaches the same conclusion as the
secular argument. To ask herself that question would be for the legis-
lator to ask herself whether she would find the secular argument per-
suasive if she were someone other than the person she is, someone
without the particular religious beliefs she has. Such a counterfactual
89. History teaches us to be skeptical as well about government acting as an arbiter of moral
truth, but there is no way that even a government of very limited powers can avoid making some
moral judgments. By contrast, there is simply no need for government to make religious judg-
ments about the requirements of human well-being.
90. Thus, I am skeptical that Robert Audi's requirement of adequate secular motivation could
often be implemented. For a recent critique of Audi's position, see Jeff Jordan, Religious Rea-
sons and Public Reasons, 11 PUB. AFF. Q. 245 (1997).
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inquiry is not only often hopelessly difficult, but, more importantly,
beside the point. The proper question is not whether someone else
would find the secular argument persuasive, but whether, on reflec-
tion, she finds it persuasive. The question she should ask herself is
whether, in addition to the religious argument she accepts, she finds
persuasive a secular argument that reaches the same conclusion about
the requirements of human well-being. True, one might be more in-
clined to find persuasive a secular argument if one already accepts a
religious argument that reaches the same conclusion. But there's
nothing to be done about that.
That a legislator or other policymaker or citizen cannot reach a
judgment about the soundness of the relevant secular argument or ar-
guments on her own is not disabling, because she can seek the help of
those whose judgment she respects and trusts; she can, in the end, rely
on their judgment. After all, relying on the judgment of those we re-
spect and trust is one quite ordinary way we decide whether to accept
propositions that for one reason or another we are not competent or
otherwise in a position to evaluate by ourselves. The judgment of
others we respect and trust is typically a fundamental criterion of the
persuasiveness of such propositions. This is true with respect to pro-
positions about, say, subatomic reality or the performance of the stock
market. It is no less true with respect to propositions about the re-
quirements of human well-being.
The principle of self-restraint I am recommending here is quite
modest if and to the extent it would not be difficult for a religious
believer to locate an independent, corroborating secular argument
about the requirements of human well-being that she could accept as
sound. Indeed, if one believes that it would rarely if ever be difficult
for a religious believer to locate such an argument, one might wonder
whether my principle of self-restraint is not modest to the point of
being inconsequential and scarcely worth defending. Moreover, one
might wonder why it should matter if some policymakers were to
make a political choice about the morality of human conduct solely on
the basis of a religious argument about human well-being, if it is ex-
tremely unlikely that in a country like the United States, any such
political choice would be established (or maintained) as law or public
policy unless supported by a widely accepted secular argument about
the requirements of human well-being?
My response to such thoughts relies on the value of maintaining a
pervasively and vigorously "ecumenical" politics. 91 I have written at
91. Thanks to Laura Underkuffier for helping me to see this.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
length in support of ecumenical politics. 92 Consider the ecumenical
function of the practice I am recommending here; consider the ecu-
menical political culture such a practice can help to cultivate. For citi-
zens and, especially, their elected representatives to decline to make a
political choice about the morality of human conduct unless a persua-
sive secular argument supports the choice, and, concomitantly, for
them to rely at least partly on a secular argument in public political
debate about whether to make the choice, helps American politics to
maintain a relatively ecumenical character rather than a sectarian one.
It does so by deemphasizing one of the most fundamental things that
divides us-religion-and in that sense and to that extent is one way
of reinforcing, rather than tearing, the bonds of political community. 93
Note, too, that having to present and defend a secular argument in
public political debate is at least somewhat constraining. But even if
the practice is not, for some, very constraining, secular political argu-
ments, once presented in public political debate, are available for test-
ing there; they are not immune to counterargument. At the end of the
day, such an argument may be less credible-and therefore less widely
influential-than it was at the beginning. Consider, in that regard,
how well secular arguments about the (im)morality of same-sex mar-
riages are faring.94
It is difficult to understand why any religious community that hon-
ors the ideal of self-critical rationality (as any religious community
should) would object to the "ecumenizing" practice I am recom-
mending here, given that, as I said, insisting on a persuasive secular
argument in support of a claim about the requirements of human well-
being is one important way for a religious community to honor the
ideal. It is especially difficult to understand why any religious commu-
nity that values ecumenical dialogue with those outside the commu-
nity would object to such a practice, which can only serve to facilitate
such dialogue.95 Only a historically naive religious (or other) tradition
92. See PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 82, at 83-127.
93. 1 have discussed the nature of political community, understood as a "community of judg-
ment," elsewhere-and I have explained why political community, thus understood, is a good.
See id.
94. See Siker, supra note 12, at 181-83.
95. 1 have discussed the value of ecumenical political dialogue elsewhere. See PERRY, LOVE
AND POWER, supra note 82, at 83-127. See also DAVID LOCHHEAD, THE DIALOGICAL IMPERA-
rIVE: A CHRISTIAN REFLECTION ON INTERFAITH ENCOUNTER 79 (1988):
In more biblical terms, the choice between monologue and dialogue is the choice be-
tween death and life. If to be human is to live in community with fellow human beings,
then to alienate ourselves from community, in monologue, is to cut ourselves off from
our own humanity. To choose monologue is to choose death. Dialogue is its own
justification.
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would doubt the value of ecumenical dialogue, which is, among other
things, a profoundly important project for anyone committed to the
ideal of self-critical rationality.
There is, of course, much to gain by sharpening our understanding
in dialogue with those who share a common heritage and common
experience with us .... Critical understanding of the [religious] tra-
dition and a critical awareness of our own relationship to it, how-
ever, is sharpened by contact with those who differ from us. Indeed,
for these purposes, the less they are like us, the better.96
Defending the moderate style of his participation in public discourse
about abortion and other issues implicating what he famously called
"the consistent ethic of life," the late Joseph Cardinal Bernardin,
Archbishop of Chicago, wrote:
The substance of the consistent ethic yields a style of teaching it and
witnessing to it. The style should ... not [be] sectarian .... [W]e
should resist the sectarian tendency to retreat into a closed circle,
convinced of our truth and the impossibility of sharing it with
others....
The style should be persuasive, not preachy .... We should be
convinced we have much to learn from the world and much to teach
it.... A confident church will speak its mind, seek as a community
to live its convictions, but leave space for others to speak to us, help
us grow from their perspective . . .97
For the sake of clarity, let me restate the basic position I am defend-
ing here: In making a political choice about the morality of human
conduct, especially a coercive political choice, legislators and other
policymakers and even ordinary citizens have good reason to forgo
reliance on a religious argument about human well-being unless, in
their view, a persuasive secular argument reaches the same conclusion
about the requirements of human well-being as the religious argu-
ment.98 Now, someone might conclude that according to this position,
96. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 79 (quoting Robin W. Lovin, Why the
Church Needs the World: Faith, Realism, and the Public Life (1988 Sorenson Lecture at the Yale
Divinity School)).
97. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, The Consistent Ethic of Life After Webster, 19 ORIGINS 741,
748 (1990).
98. Consider a religious argument to the effect that the human fetus is a human being in the
relevant sense-for example, the argument that God has "ensouled" the human fetus, and that
therefore the human fetus should be treated with the same respect and concern with which born
human beings should be treated. Such an argument is not the argument that all born human
beings are sacred, nor is the argument about the requirements of human well-being. How should
such an argument be treated under the regime I am recommending here? As a practical matter,
the question seems unimportant. Even if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that political
reliance on such an argument should be constrained in the way that political reliance on a reli-
gious argument about the requirements of human well-being should (in my view) be constrained,
it is nonetheless the case that anyone who accepts such an argument-a religious argument that
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the moral insight achieved over time by the various religious tradi-
tions, by the various historically extended religious communities, has
at most only a marginal place in public political debate about the mo-
rality of human conduct. (Consider, in that regard, the statement by
Pope John Paul II that I have put at the beginning of this essay, the
statement the Pope made in December 1997, in receiving the creden-
tials of Lindy Boggs as Ambassador to the Holy See. 99) But such a
conclusion would be mistaken-for four reasons.
the fetus is a human being in the relevant sense-will almost certainly also accept, and can also
always rely on, an additional argument that is not problematic under the regime I am recom-
mending here: the argument, which is not religious, that there is no nonarbitrary way to draw the
bounds of the human community short of conception. See, e.g., Robert F. George, Book Re-
view, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 445 (1994) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANIASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993)): "Opponents
of abortion ... view all human beings, including the unborn ... , as members of the community of
subjects to whom duties in justice are owed .... The real issue of principle between supporters
of abortion ... and opponents... has to do with the question of who are subjects of justice." Id.
In George's view, "[t]he challenge to the orthodox liberal view of abortion ... is to identify
nonarbitrary grounds for holding that the unborn.., do not qualify as subjects of justice." Id. at
445-46. George then adds: "Frankly, I doubt that this challenge can be met. In any event, Dwor-
kin here fails to make much progress toward meeting it." Id. at 446. Cf. AMY GUTMANN &
DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL CONFLICT CANNOT BE
AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 75 (1996): "Although pro-life
advocates sometimes invoke a religious conception of human life, the belief that the fetus is a
human being with constitutional rights does not depend on a distinctively religious conception of
personhood."
How should a religious argument that only some human beings are sacred be treated under
the regime I am recommending here? Any argument to that effect, including a religious one, is
contrary both to liberal democracy and to the idea of human rights. See Brittan, supra note 71
and accompanying text.
What about a religious argument that animals, too, are sacred-or that they are not? (Thanks
to Mayer Freed for raising this question.) Or a religious argument that fetuses are not sacred?
How should such arguments be treated under the regime I am recommending here? Are there
plausible secular arguments about who or what is or is not sacred (inviolable, etc.)? I'm skepti-
cal. See PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 3-9. This is not to deny that
there are very plausible secular (i.e., nonreligious) arguments to the effect that claiming that
members of set A are sacred while denying that members of set B are, is, or seems to be,
arbitrary.
99. See supra text accompanying note 1. The Pope has made other, similar statements. In
October 1995, for example, during a homily delivered at a mass in Baltimore, John Paul asked:
Can the biblical wisdom which played such a formative part in the very founding of
your country be excluded from the [political] debate [about the morality of human
conduct]? Would not doing so mean that America's founding documents no longer
have any defining content, but are only the formal dressing of changing opinion?
Would not doing so mean that tens of millions of Americans could no longer offer the
contribution of their deepest convictions to the formation of public policy?
Words of Faith and Freedom: The Text of the Homily Delivered in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1995, at B5 (quoting Pope John Paul II). Two months later, in the Vatican newspaper
L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, the Pope recurred to the same theme:
I am thinking here of the claim that a democratic society should relegate to the realm
of private opinion its members' religious beliefs and the moral convictions which derive
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First, as I emphasized earlier in this essay, there are good reasons
not merely for tolerating but for encouraging the airing-and test-
ing-of religiously-based moral arguments in public political debate.
There is no need to rehearse the point here.
Second, unlike religious arguments about human well-being, reli-
gious arguments about human worth-in particular, religious argu-
ments that each and every human being is sacred-are not covered by
the position I am defending here.
In his review of Religion in Politics, Kurt Lash writes that "[Perry's]
vision of reasonable religious dialogue seems but a shadow of the im-
passioned rhetoric that [has] characterized" religious participation in
debates about such matters as slavery and abortion. 100 Lash
continues:
[T]o remove, or "civilize," the religious voice whenever it is based
on controversial religious assumptions seems to me to remove what
is simultaneously most valuable and most dangerous about religious
rhetoric. "Dogmatic" religious arguments may, of course, lead to
holy wars, crusades, and the burning of heretics. But they may also
lead to the abolition of slavery, prod a national conscience into
passing civil rights legislation, or shame us into consideration of the
poor, the infirm, and the untouchable. In other words, religious
rhetoric is capable of radical evil and radical good. For every Wil-
liam Lloyd Garrison there is a John Brown.101
Lash's point is misdirected. The fundamental religious argument that
the issues Lash mentions all implicate-the issues of slavery, abortion,
racial discrimination, the condition of the poor, the infirm, and other
from faith. At first glance, this appears to be an attitude of necessary impartiality and
"neutrality" on the part of society in relation to those of its members who follow differ-
ent religious traditions or none at all. Indeed, it is widely held that this is the only
enlightened approach possible in a modern pluralistic State.
But if citizens are expected to leave aside their religious convictions when they take
part in public life, does this not mean that society not only excludes the contribution of
religion to its institutional life, but also promotes a culture which re-defines man as less
than he is? In particular, there are moral questions at the core of every great public
issue. Should citizens whose moral judgments are informed by their religious beliefs be
less welcome to express their most deeply held convictions? When that happens, is not
democracy itself emptied of real meaning? Should not genuine pluralism imply that
firmly held convictions can be expressed in vigorous and respectful public dialogue?
Man Is Bound by Nature To Seek the Truth, L'OSsERVATORE ROMANO, Dec. 1995 (Weekly ed.),
at 1 (quoting Pope John Paul II).
100. Lash, supra note 66, at 1101.
101. Id. at 1119. In support of his position, Lash quotes Mark Tushnet: "When faced with an
issue of transcendent importance-slavery in the nineteenth century, or abortion (for some) in
the twentieth-, people can reasonably say, 'Getting the right answer to this question is more
important than preserving a stable moral order in which injustice prevails."' Id. at 1120 (quoting
Mark Tushnet, The Constitutional Law of Religion Outside the Courts (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author)).
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marginalized ("untouchable") groups-is the argument that each and
every human being is sacred. But it is precisely that argument that is
not covered by the position I am defending here. (It is not covered for
the reasons I have presented in Section IIB of the essay.) 102 There-
fore, it simply misconceives my position to say that "the impassioned
religious rhetoric" that has characterized religious participation in de-
bates about such matters as slavery and abortion would be, if my pre-
scription were followed, reduced to a shadow of itself. For example,
nothing that Martin Luther King, Jr. said about the fundamental
equality of each and every human being in the eyes of the Creator
God would be in the least bit problematic according to the position I
am defending in this essay. 10 3
Third, my point is not that in making a political choice about the
morality of human conduct, religious believers ought not to rely on a
religious argument about human well-being; my point is only that they
ought not to do so unless a persuasive (to them) secular argument
reaches the same conclusion as the religious argument on which they
are inclined to rely. In other words, in making a political choice about
the morality of human conduct-a political choice that rests on a
claim about the requirements of human well-being-religious believ-
ers should rely at least partly on a secular argument about the require-
ments of human well-being. This is not even to say that a believer's
principal reliance should always be on the secular argument.
Thus, there could be, under my position, "impassioned religious
rhetoric" even about an issue, like the morality of same-sex marriage,
that implicates religious beliefs about the requirements of human
well-being. My argument, in this essay, is only that in making a policy
choice about the morality of human conduct, Christians and other reli-
gious believers have their own reasons-reasons internal both to their
own religious (theological) tradition and to their own historical experi-
ence-to forgo reliance on a religious argument about human well-
being in the absence of an independent, corroborating secular argu-
ment. Again, this is not even to say that a believer's principal reliance
should always be on the secular argument. I amplify this point, about
the kind of reasons ("internal" reasons) that Christians and others
have, in the next section of this essay.
102. See supra pp. 20-25 and accompanying notes.
103. Similarly, nothing that any "pro-life" religious believer might say about the sacredness of
each and every human life-and about the absence of any nonarbitrary reason for drawing the
boundaries of the human community in a way that excludes the unborn-would be problematic
under the regime I am recommending here. See supra note 98.
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Fourth, the moral insight achieved over time by a religious tradi-
tion-the insight into the requirements of human well-being-be-
cause it is the yield of the lived experience of an historically extended
human community, might well have a resonance and indeed an au-
thority that extends far beyond just those who accept the tradition's
religious claims. Put another way, many of the most basic claims
about human well-being made by one or another religious tradition
are often made, and in any event can be made, without invoking any
religious claim (i.e., any claim about the existence, nature, activity, or
will of God). What Catholic moral theologian James Burtchaell has
explained about the nature of moral inquiry or discernment in the
Catholic religious tradition is true of any religious tradition, although
not every religious tradition will accept it as true:
The Catholic tradition embraces a long effort to uncover the truth
about human behavior and experience. Our judgments of good and
evil focus on whether a certain course of action will make a human
being grow and mature and flourish, or whether it will make a per-
son withered, estranged and indifferent. In making our evaluations,
we have little to draw on except our own and our forebears' experi-
ence, and whatever wisdom we can wring from our debate with
others.
Nothing is specifically Christian about this method of making
judgments about human experience. That is why it is strange to call
any of our moral convictions "religious," let alone sectarian, since
they arise from a dialogue that ranges through so many communi-
ties and draws from so many sources. 10 4
The fourth reason merits elaboration. Many religious believers and
nonbelievers alike seem to overlook the overwhelming extent to
which both the development of insight into human well-being and the
debate that attends such development is, inside religious traditions as
much as outside them, nonrevelational and even nontheological. Be-
cause the moral insight achieved over time by the various religious
traditions is substantially nonrevelational and even nontheological,
bringing that insight to bear in a politics in which religious believers'
participation is self-restrained in the way I am recommending here (or
104. James Tunstead Burtchaell, The Sources of Conscience, 13 NOTRE DAME MAG. 20, 20-21
(Winter 1984-85). On our neighbor always turning out to be the most unlikely person, see Luke
10:29-37. Burtchaell continues:
And when debate and dialogue and testimony do fructify into conviction, and convic-
tion into consensus, nothing could be more absurd than to expect that consensus to be
confined within a person's privacy or a church's walls. Convictions are what we live by.
Do we have anything better to share with one another?
Burtchaell, supra, at 21. (For a revised version of Burtchaell's essay, and for several other essays
by Burtchaell, see JAMES TUNSTEAD BURTCHAELL, THE GIVING AND TAKING OF LIFE (1989).)
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in a politics restrained by the ideal of nonestablishment) is not the
problem some religious believers and nonbelievers imagine it to be.
The Jesuit priest and sociologist John Coleman has observed, in a pas-
sage that reflects Aquinas's influence: "[M]any elements and aspects
of a religious ethic ... can be presented in public discussion in ways
that do not presume assent to them on the specific premises of a faith
grounded in revelation. Without being believing Hindus, many Wes-
terners, after all, find in Gandhi's social thought a superior vision of
the human than that of ordinary liberal premises.' 05 Martin Marty
has commented, in much the same spirit, that "religionists who do not
invoke the privileged insights of their revelation or magisterium can
enhance and qualify rationality with community experience, intuition,
attention to symbol, ritual, and narrative. o10 6
Indeed, to embrace a religious premise-a biblical premise, for ex-
ample-about what it means to be human, about how it is good or
fitting for human beings to live their lives, and then to rely on the
premise in public discourse, one need not be a participant in the reli-
gious tradition that has yielded the premise; indeed, one need not
even be a religious believer. One certainly does not have to be Jewish
to recognize that the prophetic vision of the Jewish Bible is profound
and compelling, any more than one has to be Catholic or Presbyterian
or Baptist or even Christian to recognize that the Gospel vision of
what it means to be human is profound and compelling. Gandhi was
not a Christian, but he recognized the Gospel vision as profound and
compelling. As the eminent Catholic theologian David Tracy has
emphasized:
Some interpret the religious classics not as testimonies to a revela-
tion from Ultimate Reality .... but as testimonies to possibility it-
self. As Ernst Bloch's interpretations of all those daydreams and
Utopian and eschatological visions that Westerners have ever dared
to dream argue, the religious classics can also become for nonbeliev-
ing interpreters testimonies to resistance and hope. As Mircea
Eliade's interpretations of the power of the archaic religions show,
the historian of religions can help create a new humanism which
retrieves forgotten classic religious symbols, rituals, and
myths. 10 7 . . . If the work of Bloch and [Walter] Benjamin on the
classic texts and symbols of the eschatological religions and the
work of Eliade and others on the primal religions were allowed to
enter into the contemporary conversation, then the range of pos-
105. COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY, supra note 17, at 196.
106. Martin E. Marty, When My Virtue Doesn't Match Your Virtue, 105 CHRISTIAN CENTURY
1094, 1096 (1988). Marty adds: "Of course, these communities and their spokespersons argue
with one another. But so do philosophical rationalists." Id.
107. TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY, supra note 19, at 88 (citations omitted).
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sibilities we ordinarily afford ourselves would be exponentially ex-
panded beyond reigning Epicurean, Stoic, and nihilistic visions.'
08
So, there are four main reasons why it is simply not true that ac-
cording to my position, the moral insight achieved over time by the
various religious traditions has at most only a marginal place in public
political debate about the morality of human conduct. These reasons
include the point I have just been emphasizing: If, as the comments by
Burtchaell, Coleman, and Tracy suggest, religious-moral insight can
speak with a powerful resonance even to nonbelievers, and thereby
play a central role even in a thoroughly secularized politics, then such
insight can certainly play a central role in American politics, which is
far from being thoroughly secularized. 10 9
III. THEOLOGICALLY CONSERVATIVE BELIEVERS
Again, most Christians in the United States today-including
Catholics, Lutherans, Episcopalians, Methodists, and "reformed"
Christians (e.g., Presbyterians)-have no basis in their religious-moral
traditions for doubting that any religious argument about the require-
ments of human well-being is of questionable soundness unless a per-
108. Id. at 88-89.
109. "But, the objection may be pressed," writes Basil Mitchell,
can a religious body argue its case in a secular forum (i.e., one that is not already
antecedently committed to the religion in question)? Either, it may be said, it will rely
on Christian premises, which ex hypothesi opponents will not accept; or it will employ
purely secular premises, in which case the ensuing law will not be Christian. In neither
case will any genuine debate have taken place between Christians and non-Christians.
The dichotomy, however, is altogether too neat to be convincing. It presupposes that
there is and always must be a complete discontinuity between Christian and secular
reasoning. Certainly this can occur-if, for example, the Christian is an extreme funda-
mentalist and the secular thinker regards individual preferences as the sole basis for
morality.... But, . . . Christians would presumably want to argue (at least, many of
them would) that the Christian revelation does not require us to interpret the nature of
man in ways for which there is otherwise no warrant but rather affords a deeper under-
standing of man as he essentially is. If that is so, there is room for a genuine exchange
of ideas.
Mitchell, supra note 80, at 21.
Assume that one believes that God is, for all things, including all human beings, the beginning
and the end, the Alpha and the Omega. That God is, for all human beings, the Alpha and the
Omega does not entail that the world God has created is one in which knowledge about human
well-being is not "in principle" achievable by those who do not believe in God. That is, it does
not entail that the world is one in which knowledge of the politically relevant sort about the
requirements of human well-being-knowledge of the sort relevant to the sorts of coercive polit-
ical choices a liberal democracy committed to nonestablishment is free to make-is not achieva-
ble by those who do not believe in God (Buddhists, for example).
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suasive secular argument reaches the same conclusion about those
requirements as the religious argument. Nor, in particular, do they
have a basis in their traditions for doubting that any argument about
the requirements of human well-being that is grounded on a claim
about what God has revealed is highly suspect if no persuasive secular
route reaches the religious argument's conclusion about the require-
ments of human well-being. Such Christians understand that they do
not have to choose between "faith" and "reason"; for them, faith and
reason are not in tension, they are not incompatible. To the contrary,
faith and reason are, for such Christians, mutually enriching. David
Hollenbach explains:
Faith and understanding go hand in hand in both the Catholic and
Calvinist views of the matter. They are not adversarial but recipro-
cally illuminating. As [David] Tracy puts it, Catholic social thought
seeks to correlate arguments drawn from the distinctively religious
symbols of Christianity with arguments based on shared public ex-
perience. This effort at correlation moves back and forth on a two-
way street. It rests on a conviction that the classic symbols of Chris-
tianity can uncover meaning in personal and social existence that
common sense and uncontroversial science fail to see. So it invites
those outside the church to place their self-understanding at risk by
what Tracy calls conversation with such "classics." . . . At the same
time, the believer's self-understanding is also placed at risk because
it can be challenged to development or even fundamental change by
dialogue with the other-whether this be a secular agnostic, a Chris-
tian from another tradition, or a Jew, Muslim, or Buddhist.110
Predictably, some Christians-in particular, "fundamentalist"
Christians and some "evangelical" Christians-will be skeptical that
an argument about human well-being that is grounded on a claim
about what God has revealed is highly suspect if there is no secular
route to, if there is no argument "based on shared public experience"
for, the religious argument's conclusion about the requirements of
human well-being. For such Christians, faith-including faith in what
God has revealed-and reason are often incompatible; in their view,
human reason is too corrupted to be trusted. For example, David
Smolin, a law professor who identifies himself as an evangelical Chris-
tian, has written that
even our intellectual capacities have been distorted by the effects of
sin. The pervasive effects of sin suggest that creation, human na-
ture, and human reason are often unreliable means for knowing the
law of God .... Thus, scripture and Christian tradition have come
to have a priority among the sources of knowledge of God's will.
Indeed, these sources of revelation are considered a means of mea-
110. Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion, supra note 22, at 894-95.
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suring and testing claims made on behalf of reason, nature, or crea-
tion, in order to purify these now subsidiary means of the distortive
effect of sin.111
However, theologically conservative Christians should not overlook
that, as the history of Christianity discloses, sin can distort, and indeed
has often distorted, "scripture and Christian tradition," not to mention
what human beings believe about "scripture and Christian tradi-
tion. '112 Given their belief in the "fallenness" of human nature-
which is, after all, their nature, too-Christians should be especially
alert to this dark possibility. Smolin privileges religiously-based moral
arguments over secular moral arguments, but both sorts of arguments
are, finally, human arguments. Why, then, doesn't a truly robust sense
of "the distortive effect of sin" counsel that religious believers test
religious arguments about the morality of human conduct-in particu-
lar, religious arguments about human well-being, both those based on
scripture and those based on tradition-not only with competing reli-
gious arguments about the morality of human conduct, but also with
secular arguments about the morality of human conduct? Under-
standably, a religious believer might want to move in the other direc-
tion as well: One might want to test secular arguments about the
morality of human conduct with religiously-based moral arguments as
well as test the latter with the former. 113
Few religious believers, after all, will want to argue that secular ar-
guments are rarely if ever to be trusted, for most religious believers
rely on secular arguments every day: secular arguments about what
food is best to eat, about what the weather is likely to be tomorrow,
about what medicine to take to combat an infection, and so on. Theo-
logically conservative Christians-and, indeed, theologically conserva-
tive members of other religious traditions as well-would do well to
study Mark Noll's powerful, eloquent book, The Scandal of the Evan-
gelical Mind.1 4 Noll-the McManis Professor of Christian Thought at
111. David M. Smolin, The Enforcement of Natural Law by the State: A Response to Professor
Calhoun, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381, 391-92 (1991) (footnote omitted).
112. See Audi, supra note 80.
113. The "asymmetry" that characterizes Robert Audi's position also characterizes mine. See
Robert Audi, Wolterstorff on Religion, Politics, and the Liberal State, in RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE, supra note 45, at 121, 123:
[Tjhe chief asymmetry in my treatment of secular and religious reasons is in the ab-
sence of a counterpart condition regarding religious reasons-one requiring an eviden-
tially adequate and motivationally sufficient religious reason in the same cases. To
require this would not only make theological assumptions that are inappropriate to
liberalism, but would also require some sort of religious attitude on the part of citizens
who conscientiously take part in the full range of democratic decisions open to them as
participants in the business of government.
114. MARK NOLL, THE SCANDAL OF THE EVANGELICAL MIND (1994).
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Wheaton College (Illinois), one of the foremost Christian (Protestant)
colleges in the United States-is himself a committed evangelical
Christian. Noll comments critically, in one chapter of his book, on the
emergence of "creation science" in evangelical Christianity:
[I]f the consensus of modern scientists, who devote their lives to
looking at the data of the physical world, is that humans have ex-
isted on the planet for a very long time, it is foolish for biblical inter-
preters to say that "the Bible teaches" the recent creation of human
beings. 1 5
Noll explains:
This does not mean that at some future time, the procedures of sci-
ence may shift in such a way as to alter the contemporary consensus.
It means that, for people today to say they are being loyal to the
Bible and to demand belief in a recent creation of humanity as a
sign of obedience to Scripture is in fact being unfaithful to the Bible,
which, in Psalm 19 and elsewhere, calls upon followers of God to
listen to the speech that God has caused the natural world to speak.
It is the same for the age of the earth and for all other questions
involving the constitution of the human race. Charles Hodges's
words from the middle of the nineteenth century are still pertinent:
"Nature is as truly a revelation of God as the Bible, and we only
interpret the Word of God by the Word of God when we interpret
the Bible by science."" 6
Consider, too, the Protestant historian George Mardsen's
observations:
Some [historical] knowledge cuts across all theories and paradigms,
and it provides all people of good sense a solid reality basis for test-
ing some aspects of theories. So in practice there is a common
ground of historical inquiry. When we look at the past, if we do it
right, what we find will in large measure correspond to what other
historians find.
From a Christian perspective, we may explain this phenomenon
simply by observing that God in his grace seems to have created
human minds with some ability to experience and know something
of the real world, including the past. Furthermore, these structures
are substantially common to all normal people so that, despite the
notorious theoretical problems of subjectivism and point of view,
we can in fact communicate remarkably well and be assured that we
are talking about the same things. It may be difficult to explain,
except as a matter of faith, what basis we have for reliance on these
common abilities; but the fact remains that only philosophers and
crackpots can long deny that often they are reliable.117
115. Id at 207.
116. Id. at 207-08 (quoting Charles Hodges) (footnote omitted).
117. George Marsden, Common Sense and the Spiritual Vision of History, in HISTORY AND
HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDINO 55, 59 (C.T. McIntire & Ronald A. Wells eds., 1984).
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Why should we believe that what Noll says about the proper relation
between religious faith and secular inquiry into the origins of human
beings is not also true about the proper relation between religious
faith and secular inquiry into the conditions of human well-being.
Why should we believe that what Marsden says about historical in-
quiry is not also true about inquiry into the conditions of human well-
being? Why should we not say, with Anthony of the Desert, a fourth-
century Christian monk: "My book, 0 philosopher, is the nature of
created things, and any time I wish to read the words of God, the
book is before me."'1 18
Two clarifications are in order at this point. First, and as I have
already emphasized, my point is not that in making a political choice
about the morality of human conduct, religious believers ought not to
rely on a religious argument about human well-being; my point is only
that they ought to forgo reliance on such an argument unless a persua-
sive (to them) secular argument reaches the same conclusion about
the requirements of human well-being as the religious argument on
which they are inclined to rely. In other words, in making a political
choice about the morality of human conduct-a political choice that
rests on a claim about the requirements of human well-being-reli-
gious believers should rely at least partly on a secular argument about
those requirements.
Second, the principle of political self-restraint I recommend here
does not presuppose that in making political choices about the moral-
ity of human conduct, Christians should forget that they are Chris-
tians, it does not presuppose that they should "bracket" their
Christian identity, that they should act as if they are persons who do
not have the religious beliefs that they in fact do have.1 19 Rather, it is
because they are Christians-it is because they are, as Christians, pain-
fully aware of the fallenness, the brokenness, of human beings-that
they should be extremely wary about making a political choice, least
of all a coercive political choice, on the basis of a religious argument
about human well-being in the absence of any independent, cor-
118. THE WISDOM OF THE DESERT 62 (Thomas Merton ed., 1960) (quoting Anthony of the
Desert).
119. I have contended against such "bracketing" elsewhere:
One's basic moral/religious convictions are (partly) self-constitutive and are therefore a
principal ground-indeed, the principal ground-of political deliberation and choice.
To "bracket" such convictions is therefore to bracket-to annihilate-essential aspects
of one's very self. To participate in politics and law... with such convictions bracketed
is not to participate as the self one is but as [someone else].
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW, supra note 32, at 181-82. See PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER, supra note 82, at 4.
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roborating secular argument. This is not to suggest that persons other
than Christians cannot or do not have their own powerful reasons to
insist on what Christians call the fallenness or brokenness of human
beings.
Thus-and I want to underscore this-my position is not of the sort
that Nicholas Wolterstorff has recently criticized; my position is not
that the morality or ethics of liberal democracy requires Christians to
forgo reliance on a religious argument about human well-being in the
absence of an independent, corroborating secular argument. 120
Again, I agree that liberal-democratic morality, properly understood,
requires no such thing. Rather, my position, as I said earlier, is that
Christians have their own reasons-reasons internal both to their own
religious (theological) tradition and to their own historical experience-
to forgo such reliance in making a policy choice about the morality of
human conduct. In that sense, my argument is not that a commitment
to liberal democracy somehow entails or otherwise supports the prin-
ciple of self-restraint that I have recommended here-though, as I
have argued elsewhere, the American constitutional ideal of "nonest-
ablishment" does, in my judgment, warrant such a principle. 121
Rather, my argument is that without regard to what a commitment to
liberal democracy entails or otherwise Supports, Christians-at least
some Christians-have their own reasons for embracing the principle
of self-restraint recommended here. (Though some others, it must be
admitted, have their own reasons for rejecting it.)
It scarcely seems radical, much less unfaithful, to suggest that Chris-
tians, too, like other religious believers, must be alert to the possibility
that a scripture-based or a tradition-based religious argument about
the morality of human conduct-about the requirements of human
well-being-no less than a secular argument, is mistaken or worse.
(The Christian argument for the permissibility of slavery was worse
than mistaken; it was sinful.) 122 Indeed, the theological and experien-
tial reasons that Christians have, as Christians, for embracing the prin-
ciple of self-restraint that I have recommended here are also reasons
that they have, as Christians, for being alert to the dark possibility that
one of their religious arguments about the morality of human conduct
is mistaken or worse. I think here of the argument, which I have criti-
cized elsewhere,'123 that all homosexual sexual conduct is immoral,
120. See Wolterstorff, Audi on Religion, Politics, and Liberal Democracy, in RELIGION IN THE
PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 45, at 147.
121. See supra text accompanying note 35.
122. See Noonan, supra note 81.
123. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 82-96.
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even homosexual sexual conduct that is embedded in and expressive of
a lifelong, monogamous relationship of faithful love-indeed, that is a
generative matrix of such a relationship, of such love. 124 There is no
virtue in adhering to a position uncritically, so that one is unable to
discern whether the position is, or might be, mistaken. Again, "[w]e
must be willing to let our convictions be, tested in ecumenical dialogue
with others who do not share them. We must let ourselves be tested,
in ecumenical dialogue, by convictions we do not share. We must, in
short, resist the temptations of infallibilism.' 1 25 Although some might
think that my point here is obvious-even banal-the point is too
often neglected in debates about the proper role of religion in politics
and, so, bears emphasis.
At any stage in history all that is available to the Church is its con-
tinual meditation on the Word of God in the light of contemporary
experience and of the knowledge and insights into reality which it
possesses at the time. To be faithful to that set of circumstances...
is the charge and the challenge which Christ has given to his
Church. But if there is a historical shift, through improvement in
scholarship or knowledge, or through an entry of society into a sig-
nificantly different age, then what that same fidelity requires of the
Church is that it respond to the historical shift, such that it might be
not only mistaken but also unfaithful in declining to do so.126
IV. A CONCLUDING COMMENT
I have occasionally been asked about the "voice" that informs my
conception of the proper role of religion in politics. I am a Chris-
124. See id. at 83.
125. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS' AND LAW, supra note 32, at 183.
126. MAHONEY, supra note 79, at 327 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). John Noonan's
eloquent plea bears quotation here:
One cannot predict future changes; one can only follow present light and in that light
be morally certain that some obligations will never alter. The great commandments of
love of God and of neighbor, the great principles of justice and charity continue to
govern all development. God is unchanging, but the demands of the New Testament
are different from those of the Old, and while no other revelation supplements the
New, it is evident from the case of slavery alone that it has taken time to ascertain what
the demands of the New really are. All will be judged by the demands of the day in
which they live. It is not within human competence to say with certainty who was or
will be saved; all will be judged as they have conscientiously acted. In new conditions,
with new insight, an old rule need not be preserved in order to honor a past discipline.
In the Church there can always be fresh appeal to Christ, there is always the possibil-
ity of probing new depths of insight.... Must we not, then, frankly admit that change is
something that plays a role in [Christian] moral teaching? ... Yes, if the principle of
change is the person of Christ.
Noonan, supra note 83, at 676-77.
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tian,127 in particular, a Catholic Christian thoroughly imbued with the
spirit of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).128 But I am a Chris-
tian who is extremely wary of the "God"-talk in which most Christians
(and many others) too often and too easily engage; in that sense, my
Christianity tends toward the apophatic.12 9 Thus, I stand between, on
127. See David Tracy, Approaching the Christian Understanding of God, in 1 SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY: ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES 131, 147 (Francis Schfissler Fiorenza & John P.
Galvin eds., 1991): "[According to Christian belief,] God, the holy mystery who is the origin,
sustainer, and end of all reality ... is disclosed to us in Jesus Christ as pure, unbounded love."
See also JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, JESUS: A REVOLUTIONARY BIOGRAPHY 200 (1994): "Chris-
tian belief is (1) an act of faith (2) in the historical Jesus (3) as the manifestation of God."
128. See David Hollenbach, S.J., Afterword: A Community of Freedom, in CATHOLICISM AND
LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 323, 337 (R. Bruce Douglass
& David Hollenbach, S.J. eds., 1994):
For Christian believers, it is a challenge to recognize that their faith in God and the way
of life it entails is a historical reality-it is rooted in historically particular scriptures
and symbols and it is lived and sustained in historically particular communities. This
historicity means that the task of interpreting the meaning of their faith will never be
done as long as history lasts. The God in whom they place their faith can never be
identified with any personal relationship, social arrangement, or cultural achievement.
God transcends all of these. Though Christians believe that in Jesus Christ they have
been given a definitive revelation of who this God is, they cannot claim to possess or
encompass God in any of their theologies or understandings of the ultimate good of
human life. Thus, in the words of Avery Dulles, "The Christian is defined as a person
on the way to discovery, on the way to a revelation not yet given, or at least not yet
given in final form."
(quoting Avery Dulles, S.J., Revelation and Discovery, in THEOLOGY AND DISCOVERY: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF KARL RAHNER 27 (William J. Kelly, S.J. ed., 1980)). Hollenbach adds:
Because the Christian community is always on the way to the fullness of its own deep-
est faith, hope, and love, it must be continually open to fresh discoveries. Encounter
with the other, the different, and the strange must therefore characterize the life of the
church. Active participation in a community of freedom is a prerequisite to such
discovery.
Id. at 337. See Michael J. Perry, The Idea of a Catholic University, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 325 (1995).
129. On apophatic Christianity, see WILLIAM C. PLACHER, THE DOMESTICATION OF TRAN-
SCENDENCE: How MODERN THINKING ABOUT GOD WENT WRONG (1996). I concur in David
Tracy's statement:
In and through even the best speech for Ultimate Reality, greater obscurity eventually
emerges to manifest a religious sense of that Reality as ultimate mystery. Silence may
be the most appropriate kind of speech for evoking this necessary sense of the radical
mystery-as mystics insist when they say, "Those who know do not speak; those who
speak do not know." The most refined theological discourse of the classic theologians
ranges widely but returns at last to a deepened sense of the same ultimate mystery: the
amazing freedom with all traditional doctrinal formulations in Meister Eckhart; the
confident portrayals of God in Genesis and Exodus become the passionate outbursts of
the prophets and the painful reflections of Job, Ecclesiastes, and Lamentations; the
disturbing light cast by the biblical metaphors of the "wrath of God" on all temptations
to sentimentalize what love means when the believer says, "God is love"; the proclama-
tion of the hidden and revealed God in Luther and Calvin; the deus otiosus vision of
God in the Gnostic traditions; the repressed discourse of the witches; the startling fe-
male imagery for Ultimate Reality in both the great matriarchal traditions and the
great Wisdom traditions of both Greeks and Jews; the power of the sacred dialectically
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the one side, all religious nonbelievers and, on the other, many Chris-
tian and other religious believers, especially theologically conservative
believers.
Religious nonbelievers, many of whom (like Richard Rorty) would
like to marginalize the role of religious discourse in public political
debate, are the principal addressees of my argument that it is not
merely permissible but important that religious arguments about the
morality of human conduct be presented in public political debate.
(This point seems obvious enough in any political community commit-
ted-as any genuine liberal democracy is committed-to freedom of
divorcing itself from the profane manifested in all religions; the extraordinary subtleties
of rabbinic writing on God become the uncanny paradoxes of kabbalistic thought on
God's existence in the very materiality of letters and texts; the subtle debates in Hindu
philosophical reflections on monism and polytheism; the many faces of the Divine in
the stories of Shiva and Krishna; the puzzling sense that, despite all appearances to the
contrary, there is "nothing here that is not Zeus" in Aeschylus and Sophocles; the ter-
ror caused by Dionysius in Euripides' Bacchae; the refusal to cling even to concepts of
"God" in order to become free to experience Ultimate Reality as Emptiness in much
Buddhist thought; the moving declaration of that wondrous clarifier Thomas Aquinas,
"All that I have written is straw; I shall write no more"; Karl Rahner's insistence on the
radical incomprehensibility of both God and ourselves understood through and in our
most comprehensible philosophical and theological speech; ... the "God beyond God"
language of Paul Tillich and all theologians who acknowledge how deadening tradi-
tional "God"-language can easily become; the refusal to speak God's name in classical
Judaism; the insistence on speaking that name in classical Islam; the hesitant musings
on the present-absent God in Buber become the courageous attempts to forge new
languages for a new covenant with God in the post-tremendum theologies of Cohen,
Fackenheim, and Greenberg. There is no classic discourse on Ultimate Reality that can
be understood as mastering its own speech. If any human discourse gives true testi-
mony to Ultimate Reality, it must necessarily prove uncontrollable and unmasterable.
TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY, supra note 19, at 108-09. See also HANS KONG, DOES
GOD EXIST? AN ANSWER FOR TODAY 508 (1980) (quoting Martin Buber) (footnote omitted):
["God"] is the most loaded of all words used by men. None has been so soiled, so
mauled. But that is the very reason I cannot give it up. Generations of men have
blamed this word for the burdens of their troubled lives and crushed it to the ground; it
lies in the dust, bearing all their burdens. Generations of men with their religious divi-
sions have torn the word apart; they have killed for it and died for it; it bears all their
fingerprints and is stained with all their blood. Where would I find a word to equal it,
to describe supreme reality? If I were to take the purest, most sparkling term from the
innermost treasury of the philosophers, I could capture in it no more than a noncom-
mittal idea, not the presence of what I mean, of what generations of men in the vastness
of their living and dying have venerated and degraded.... We must respect those who
taboo it, since they revolt against the wrong and mischief that were so readily claimed
to be authorized in the name of God; but we cannot relinquish it. It is easy to under-
stand why there are some who propose a period of silence about the "last things," so
that the misused words may be redeemed. But this is not the way to redeem them. We
cannot clean up the term "God" and we cannot make it whole; but, stained and mauled
as it is, we can raise it from the ground and set it above an hour of great sorrow.
For a powerful and acclaimed recent reflection on "God"-talk, see ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON, SHE
WHO Is: THE MYSTERY OF GOD IN FEMINIST THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE (1992).
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expression.) Religious nonbelievers are also the principal addressees
of my argument that the premise that all human beings are sacred is
an unproblematic basis of political choice in the United States-and,
more broadly, in any liberal democracy-even if, as I have suggested
elsewhere, no plausible or even intelligible secular argument supports
the premise.
By contrast, religious believers-in particular, Christians, who, as
the twentieth century draws to a close, still constitute the largest
group, by far, of religious believers in the United States-are the prin-
cipal addressees of my argument that in making a political choice
about the morality of human conduct, especially a coercive political
choice, we believers have good reason to forgo reliance on, at least we
have good reason to be exceedingly wary about relying on, a religious
argument about human well-being unless, in our view, a persuasive
secular argument reaches the same conclusion about the requirements
of human well-being as the religious argument. Because theologically
conservative Christians are more likely than other Christians to be
skeptical about that final aspect of my position-the aspect in which
my wariness about "God"-talk is most engaged-I have spoken espe-
cially to them in the preceding section of this essay. I want to under-
score that in speaking to such Christians, I have addressed them not
imperially, from the outside, as a enlightened religious nonbeliever
speaking to benighted religious believers about what the morality of
liberal democracy proscribes. Rather, I have sought here to address
them fraternally, from the inside, as a religious believer speaking to
fellow believers, to fellow Christians, about what our shared religious
(theological) tradition and our shared historical experience suggest
about the proper role of religion in politics. I hope that in speaking to
such Christians, my comments also speak, if only indirectly, to theo-
logically conservative members of other religious traditions as well.
[Vol. 48:1
